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The Surprising Retreat 
of Union Britain 
John Pencavel 
5.1  Introduction 
An assessment of unionism in a society may be organized around three 
classes of questions: Do unions produce a better distribution of income in 
society? Do unions contribute to a more efficient society? And do unions 
enhance a society’s “social capital”?’ The first two questions are the fa- 
miliar distributional and efficiency considerations that figure in any inter- 
esting economic question. The third class of questions is less familiar to 
economists. It concerns aspects of social organization, such as civic re- 
sponsibility and engagement, that enhance self-government and voluntary 
cooperation. Associations such as labor unions are an important compo- 
nent of a society’s network of institutions that give individuals an oppor- 
tunity to shape their environments and to promote mutual assistance. Col- 
lective bargaining can be a constructive force at the workplace to resolve 
problems that arise from the necessary incompleteness of labor contracts 
and, in this way, unionism has the potential of being an effective vehicle for 
representing workers’ concerns and for influencing their work conditions. 
John Pencavel is the Pauline K. Levin, Robert and Pauline C. Levin-Abraham Levin Pro- 
fessor in Humanities and Sciences, Department of Economics, Stanford University. 
I have benefitted from comments on previous drafts of this paper by  Richard Blundell, 
Alison  Booth, Adam Seth Litwin, David Metcalf, Andrew Oswald, Norma Virgoe, and 
an anonymous referee. Research assistance from Benjamin Liu is acknowledged. 
1. While physical capital and hurnan capital refer to the machines and skills that augment 
an organization’s or an individual’s productivity, social capital alludes to aspects of the social 
structure such as trust, networks, and conventions that encourage collaboration and coordi- 
nation for shared advantage. Social capital is not embodied in a single organization or single 
individual, hut in the relations among organizations and individuals. See Coleman (1988). 
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At the same time, unionism has the potential to be a destructive agent. 
It can frustrate  cooperation,  incite  antagonisms,  and create  hardship. 
Whether, on balance, unionism is a source that adds to or detracts from a 
society’s “social capital” is a matter for determination in any particular 
context. 
In the context of Britain over the past forty years or so, the condition of 
unionism has changed remarkably. In the 1970s, the union movement in 
Britain appeared strong: the leadership was consulted on important mat- 
ters of economic policy, union membership and density were rising, and a 
royal commission (the Bullock Commission) proposed putting union lead- 
ers on company boards. This strength arose not because collective bar- 
gaining was explicitly supported by a favorable statutory framework, but 
because various indirect ways had been devised to promote unionism. This 
indirect support had been nurtured by governments of different political 
stripe and found favor with the electorate, which habitually expressed ap- 
proval of collective-bargaining as a system for determining labor contracts. 
This broad consensus broke down by the close of the 1970s. There were 
several reasons for this. Increasingly, Britain’s lackluster productivity per- 
formance was attributed to restrictive work practices enforced by unions. 
The system of collective bargaining was implicated in the accelerating rate 
of price inflation. A succession of strikes imposed a good deal of hardship 
on the community. For these and perhaps other reasons, the public’s sup- 
port for unionism reached a low point in 1979 when a new government was 
elected to power. Even  though  public support for unionism  recovered 
quickly, the new government pursued an active policy of taming the power 
and reach of unions. It was as if, in the relatively brief moment of the elec- 
torate’s disenchantment with unionism, the government seized the oppor- 
tunity to curb collective bargaining over the subsequent fifteen years or so 
and to subject it to disciplines that have left it debilitated. The retreat of 
unionism is illustrated by the drop in the fraction of workers who are union 
members in figure 5.1 and by the decline in strike activity in figure 5.2. By 
the year 2000, unionism’s role in private industry looks precarious, espe- 
cially in light of its difficulty in organizing new establishments. 1 have found 
nothing in the writing in the 1970s on unions and industrial relations that 
forecast this change in fortunes. From the perspective of the 1970s, this re- 
treat of union Britain is surprising. 
This experience raises many important questions. What caused union- 
ism’s  retreat? How has the decline in  collective bargaining affected the 
growth and distribution of incomes? What is the prevailing link between 
productivity and unionism? How has the decline in unionism affected the 
workplace experience of employees? How have unions themselves been 
affected by  this reduced status? Answers to these questions are offered in 
this paper, drawing heavily on previous research and making use especially 
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union density as implied by the Labour Force Survey  -f- 
+  number of unions 
Fig. 5.1  Number of unions and union membership density, 1970-1999 
Sources: Data drawn from issues of the Employment Gazette and Labour Market Trends. 
surveys conducted in Britain in 1980,1984,1990, and 1998.*  This and other 
information will be used to describe the changes that have taken place. 
However, while these and other data allow for a description of the changes, 
identifying causal relations requires a heavy dose of judgment. Indeed, the 
perennial problem with issues in labor relations is in unscrambling causal 
relationships where the key  forcing variables are often unmeasured  or 
poorly measured. 
The paper proceeds by sketching the state of unionism in the 1960s and 
197Os, arguing that, unlike in most other countries, British unionism was 
nurtured less by explicit statutory support and more by various indirect 
mechanisms. Because of the importance of these indirect mechanisms, the 
statutory reforms in the 1980s  and 1990s  were probably of less consequence 
2. Though linked to the earlier surveys, the 1998 survey was renamed the Workplace Em- 
ployee Relations Survey (WERS). The Workplace lndustrial Relations surveys will be refer- 
enced subsequently as WIRS (year) and, in 1998, as WERS (1998). 184  John Pencavel 
workmg days lost per thousand  employees 
+  number of stoppages 
Fig. 5.2  Disputes, 1970-1999 
Sources:  Data on stoppages are taken from issues of the Employment  Gazette and Labour 
Market Treiid.7. 
in accounting for the decline of unionism than the withdrawal of the state’s 
indirect support for collective bargaining. Perhaps the principal goal of the 
reforms was to break the link between unionism and low productivity, so 
the paper addresses what is known about unions and  productivity with spe- 
cial emphasis on what remains of the association between productivity and 
unionism in the late  1990s. Some original research on this issue is pre- 
sented. Section 5.5 asks how workers are benefitting from unionism today, 
and general conclusions complete the paper. 
5.2  The Condition of Unionism in the 1960s and 1970s 
5.2.1  General Overview 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Britain’s labor markets and industrial relations 
practices came under increasing scrutiny. This was manifested not only in The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain  185 
extensive public debate of the issues and the establishment of a royal com- 
mission (the Donovan Commission) in 1965,  but also in an increasingly ac- 
tive statutory agenda. A principal reason for this scrutiny grew out of the 
realization that Britain’s rate of economic growth was inferior to that of al- 
most all comparable economies and that Britain frequently scored poorly 
in comparisons of productivity across countries. Many explanations were 
offered for these chastening international comparisons, but the role of in- 
dustrial relations was frequently alluded to. 
For example, Pratton’s (1976) comparison of the productivity of compa- 
nies with operations in more than one country in the early 1970s found that 
those company divisions in Britain had a poor productivity record, and he 
ascribed an important part of this to union-enforced restrictive work prac- 
tices, overmanning, and strikes. Prais’s (198 1) study of manufacturing in- 
dustry came to similar sobering conclusions about British productivity 
and again identified the poor state of labor relations in Britain as partly 
responsible. One feature of British industrial relations that came in for fre- 
quent censure in accounting for these productivity patterns was the multi- 
plicity of unionism. Such a union structure was said to contribute to juris- 
dictional disputes and to give undue emphasis to the interests of narrow 
occupational groups.) 
However, by the end of the 1970s, the link established by economists be- 
tween unionism and productivity was circumstantial. Though some case 
studies indicated that unions were defending work practices that harmed 
productivity, sufficient evidence had not  been accumulated to justify  a 
statement to the effect that, in  general, unionism harmed prod~ctivity.~ 
Nevertheless, this belief came to be widely shared and contributed to the 
view that unions were a drag on productivity and economic growth. 
In their distributional activities, the popular view was that unions were 
involved in a constant effort to reallocate incomes away from dividends 
and interest and toward wages and salaries. In fact, economists brought 
forward little evidence that unionism materially affected the distribution of 
national income in this way.5 More attention was directed to the associa- 
tion between unionism and individual earnings. The first empirical studies 
of union-nonunion wage gaps in Britain were appearing in the 197Os, but 
the available data at that time did not permit confident inferences. Subse- 
3. See, for instance. Aylen’s (1982) study of the steel industry in Britain, Germany, and the 
United States. 
4.  Metcalf‘s useful survevs (1989. 1990) list onlv two relevant studies urior to 1980  and one 
of these relates to unionism before the First World War. 
5. In the classic account of movements in the share of wages in national income in Britain 
by  Phelps Brown and Hart (1952), unions are given a role, but it is largely a secondary one: 
“The course of the trade cycle brought . . . changes in the effective strength of trade unions. 
From time to time there were some greater and in part exogenous changes in union strength. 
Whether these changes affected the relative size of wages and profits depended on the market 
environment” (274). 186  John Pencavel 
quent research  suggests that the wage gaps were modest.  For instance, 
Stewart (1991) estimates union-nonunion  wage gaps in 1980 of almost 7 
percent for semiskilled workers and 2 percent for skilled workers.6  This sug- 
gests that unionism had modest effects on the wage structure. 
However,  unions’  efforts to redistribute  incomes  toward  wages  con- 
tributed to chronic upward pressure on wages and prices. When a firm or 
industry experiences wage increases induced by collective bargaining, typ- 
ically a contraction in employment and output is to be expected. The issue 
then becomes the policymaking authorities’ response to this wage-induced 
employment reduction. Britain’s tragic experience with unemployment be- 
tween the two world wars’ caused governments to give a very high priority 
to maintaining full employment, and this strong aversion to allowing un- 
employment to rise tended to make wages one of the fixed points in the sys- 
tem to which other variables adjusted.* In Hicks’ (1955) words, no longer 
was the British economy on the “Gold Standard” but on a “Labour Stan- 
dard.”’ 
With the aim of moderating wage increases without inducing a rise in un- 
employment, governments invited unions into policymaking circles and en- 
couraged them to participate in programs aimed to restrict the growth of 
all types of money incomes. These were largely fruitless in that, after remov- 
ing the effects of the business cycle, wage inflation tended to rise inexorably 
and the unemployment rate seemed to rise along with it. The form of this 
policy in the last Labour government of the 197Os, the so-called Social 
Contract, fell apart amid a wave of strikes in 1978-1979. But until Keynes- 
ian demand-management policies were totally discarded in the 1980s, the 
dominant ideas in macroeconomic policy provided an environment that 
accorded unions an influential role in the management of the economy.’” 
6. In the special case ofworkplaces with a pre-entry closed shop, these gaps were larger: 15 
percent for semiskilled and 10 percent for skilled workers. 
7. From 1921 until the outbreak of the Second World War, national insurance unemploy- 
ment rates were above 10 percent for every year except 1927, when the unemployment rate was 
9.7 percent. 
8. Another fixed point was the foreign exchange rate, although several times devaluation 
was the chosen option to adjust to macroeconomic  disequilibrium. 
9. Hicks (1955, 391) wrote, “[Tlhe world we now live in is one in which the monetary sys- 
tem has become relatively elastic, so that it can accommodate itselfto changes in wages, rather 
than the othcr way about. Instead of actual wages having to adjust themselves to an equilib- 
rium level, monetary policy adjusts to the equilibrium level of money wages so as to make it 
conform to the actual level. It is hardly an  exaggeration to say that instead of being on a Gold 
Standard, we are on a Labour Standard.” 
10. In fact,  the first  signs  of the rejection  of  Keynesianism  came from elements  in 
Callaghan’s Labour government of the 1970s. In response to yet another run on the pound, in 
1976, the chancellor of the exchequer, Dennis Healey, proposed radical reductions in public 
expenditure and the prime minister told the Labour Party Conference, “You cannot spend 
your way out of recession.” Subsequently, an abashed government sought a loan from the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF)  that came  with further strings attached in the form of cuts 
in public expenditure. The  contradictions of a Labour government with close ties to the trade 
union movement pursuing balanced budget policies that conflicted with union aspirations 
finally brought the government down in 1979. The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain  187 
Hence, by the 1970s, it is difficult to make the case that unions in Britain 
enhanced productivity or materially improved the distribution of income 
in society. However, unions were often a force for involving employees in 
shaping their work environments. The scope of collective bargaining had 
widened considerably  beyond issues of wages and work hours. Unions 
were involved in issues of work assignment, the speed and organization of 
production, workplace health and safety, and procedures for the laying off 
of workers. Indeed, these were often the very same issues that gave rise to 
questions  about  the effects of  unionism  on productivity.  By  involving 
themselves in such matters, union representatives at the place of work gave 
employees a sense of participation. The trouble is that, in some instances, 
this participation was accompanied with hostile and obstructionist pos- 
tures. Furthermore, in pursuing their goals, unions became increasingly 
tolerant of the costs imposed on the community in the form of highly dis- 
ruptive strikes. In this respect, unionism in the 1970s tended to heighten 
antagonisms within society rather than act as a force for civic engagement 
and cohesion. 
5.2.2  Strikes 
Because each country’s definition of disputes tends to differ, meaningful 
comparisons of strike activity across countries are notoriously difficult to 
make. However, taking the data at face value, by international standards, 
British unions in the 1970s did not appear reluctant to invoke the strike 
weapon. In the seventeen countries listed in table 5.1 for the 1970s, the 
United Kingdom ranks in the top half of strike-prone economies. The year 
1979 stands out as the particular “winter of discontent” that presaged 
Margaret Thatcher’s electoral victory. When the strikes were against mo- 
nopolies, they tended to impose considerable hardship on the community. 
In addition, there was evidence to suggest that the nature of these strikes 
damaged productivity.’  I 
The vast majority of strikes were unofficial in that they occurred without 
following specified procedures for settling disagreements. Often, the na- 
tional unions did not sanction them. Indeed, in many instances, the na- 
tional leadership might be quite surprised by them, although, to grant the 
strikes greater legitimacy and to exert some control over them, the national 
union would sometimes declare the strikes “official” after they had begun. 
The key figures in these unofficial strikes were the union officials at the 
place of work, the shop stewards. To many workers, the shop steward was 
11. For instance, in his research on productivity in manufacturing, Prais (1981,262-263) 
emphasized the frequency of strikes in large plants: “Not only are more man-days lost per 
employee in Britain, but there are added costs from the greater frequency of stoppages, verg- 
ing in some plants on continuous disruption; British management in large plants is not able 
to devote its main energies to the pursuit of more efficient production methods, since so much 
time is taken up in ‘fire fighting’ to keep the plant at work. . . . The present so-called ‘volun- 
tary approach’ to industrial relations seems to have been an important factor that has made 
large-scale production uncompetitive in this country.” 188  John Pencavel 
Table 5.1  Working Days Lost through Stoppages per Thousand Employees in All 
Industries and Services, Annual Averages, 1971-1980 






















































































Source: Emplqymenr Gazette (February 1982,69). 
Nores: Stoppages cover both strikes and lock-outs. Definitions and coverage of stoppages 
vary across countries, so these data should not be relied upon to justify strong inferences 
about intercountry differences. 
the human face of the union movement while the national union leadership 
consisted of remote figures with little understanding and knowledge of the 
particular issues at an employee’s place of work. Unofficial strikes tended 
to be short and they tended to be unpredictable except to some of those 
people at the place of work. Some saw unofficial strikes as the assertion by 
workers of their control over their workplaces, a form of syndicalism. Offi- 
cial strikes tended to be national (rather than local), longer, and more pre- 
dictable. It was often argued that it was the unpredictable nature of unoffi- 
cial  strikes  that  made them more costly  to employers  than the  more 
predictable official strikes and, therefore, the sort of reforms most desirable 
were those that reduced the incidence of the unofficial strikes. 
5.2.3  A Voluntary System 
According  to the conventional  account, British  unionism  flourished 
with little direct statutory support. Whereas many countries closely regu- 
lated and nurtured unionism by statutory legislation, such direct support 
12. The Donovan Commission, for example, declared, “We have no hesitation therefore in 
saying that the prevalence of unofficial strikes, and their tendency (outside coalniining)  to in- 
crease, have such serious economic implications that measures to deal with them are urgently 
necessary” (United Kingdom: Royal Commission, 1968a, 1 12). The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain  189 
of collective bargaining was remarkably  absent in  Britain. What distin- 
guished Britain among industrialized countries by the 1970s was the de- 
gree to which unionism evolved largely independent of direct regulation by 
the state. There is nothing in Britain comparable to America’s National La- 
bor Relations Act or Australia’s Conciliation and Arbitration Act, an en- 
compassing piece of statutory legislation providing a definitive reference 
for the regulation of unionism and collective bargaining. 
Illustrative of the prevailing attitudes toward unionism was the process 
by which unions became recognized by employers. Until the 1970s, there 
was no machinery to permit workers to select union representation nor to 
require an  employer to recognize a union of his ~0rkers.l~  Indeed, “yellow- 
dog” contracts, long outlawed in the United States, were not only legal in 
Britain, but in some firms still in~0ked.l~  As a group strongly supporting 
collective bargaining, the Donovan Commission deplored the lack of for- 
mal procedures to handle the issue of union recognition and the disputes 
that sometimes re~u1ted.l~  However, to an American audience familiar 
with the formal procedures enshrined in the National Labor Relations Act 
to deal with union recognition and representation, what is remarkable is 
the high union density achieved in Britain without legalistic machinery de- 
signed to force unionism on reluctant employers. 
In the 1970s, the historical narrative of British unionism highlighted a 
relatively modest piece of legislation, the Trade Disputes Act of 1906.  This 
established that a union could not be sued by an employer for damages re- 
sulting from a strike. This immunity had been the practice until 1901,  when 
the House of Lords ruled otherwise in the Taff Vale case, and the 1906 act 
restored the unions’ rights in law. Prior to the 1980s’  this act giving a union 
13. The 1975  Employment Protection Act gave the Advisory, Conciliation, and Arbitration 
Service (ACAS) the task of resolving disputes over union recognition. However, as ACAS was 
also given the duty of “encouraging the extension of collective bargaining,” employers resist- 
ant to union recognition saw ACAS not as a neutral arbiter, but as another arm of the union 
movement. Because employers were not compelled by  law to cooperate with ACAS, ulti- 
mately its authority was eroded and it became ineffectual. See the description of its activities 
and a comparison with union recognition procedures in North America in Wood and Godard 
(1999). 
14. A “yellow-dog” contract is a document signed by a worker who, as a condition of em- 
ployment, promises not to  join a union. Examples of such contracts in Britain were provided 
by the Donovan Commission (United Kingdom: Royal Commission 1968b, 54-55). 
15. In its evidence to the Donovan Commission, the Trades Union Congress wrote color- 
fully: “It may from some points of view be unfortunate that many employers only recognize 
the strength of trade unionism when this strength is exercised overtly in the form of strike ac- 
tion, but it is undoubtedly a fact that strike action to secure trade union recognition is by far 
the most successful method of dragging such employers into the twentieth century and at the 
same time, through its stimulus to the trade union recruitment, of exposing the oft-heard 
shibboleth that it is only a few troublemakers who are claiming to represent the intcrests of 
the employees. Strike action to force trade union recognition is a good example of the prin- 
ciple that industrial peace is not the same thing as good industrial relations. Strike action to 
secure recognition  is  often the pre-condition  for improving industrial relations”  (United 
Kingdom: Royal Commission 1968b, 171). 190  John Pencavel 
immunity from litigation stemming from costs imposed on an employer 
through a strike was often singled out as the most important statute  under- 
pinning British unionism. Though an important piece of legislation, the act 
is remarkable by international standards  for what little it did. For instance, 
unlike other countries’ major pieces of statutory  law on collective bargain- 
ing, this act did not precisely specify rules about the formation of unions 
and the manner in which collective bargaining was to be conducted. On the 
contrary, up to the 1970s, Britain’s industrial relations are distinctive among 
wealthy economies for the small role played by statutory legislation. 
The exceptions to this statement concern the years of and immediately 
following the two world wars when the state played a much more intrusive 
role in collective bargaining and these actions had lasting effects. In addi- 
tion, there was a period between 1971 and 1974 when an Industrial Rela- 
tions Act specified collective-bargaining agreements to be legally enforce- 
able contracts unless the parties specified otherwise. In fact, in these years, 
contracts routinely inserted disclaimer clauses of the form “this is not a 
legally enforceable agreement.” The act was largely inconsequential  be- 
cause it was boycotted by most unions and it was repealed by the Labour 
government in 1974. With these important exceptions, private employers 
and unions in Britain have usually found it in their interest to reach agree- 
ments without the law’s compelling them to do so or how to go about it. 
This is why it was often described as a “voluntary” system and it allowed 
Henry Phelps Brown (1959, 355) to write, “When British industrial rela- 
tions are compared with those of other democracies they stand out because 
they are so little regulated by law.” 
In Britain, there was no law obliging private employers to bargain with 
unions nor anything making collective-bargaining agreements enforceable 
in a court. Unlike in many other countries, no statement in law exists that 
gives workers the right to strike. Collective-bargaining agreements have an 
“untidy” appearance in that some cover all workers over the entire country 
in a particular industry while others are restricted to a small group of work- 
ers within a particular plant. Some unions represent workers in a large num- 
ber of different industries while other unions organize a small number of 
workers. The law in Britain has taken the position that these issues are best 
determined by the parties concerned with little need for state regulation. 
5.2.4  Indirect Support of Collective Bargaining 
This popular characterization of unionism in Britain before the 1980s is 
misleading. First, in its capacity as an employer, the state championed col- 
lective bargaining and, given the important role of the state as an employer 
by the 197Os, this implied that a large section of the economy was covered 
by legislation promoting unionism. Second, even in the private sector of 
the economy, the state intruded to encourage unionism, but this intrusion 
was largely indirect. Third, the Keynesian macroeconomic policies  fol- The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain  191 
lowed by successive governments in the 1960s and 1970s provided a hos- 
pitable climate for unionism. 
First, consider the role of the state as an employer. The support of col- 
lective bargaining in public employment went back at least to the Whitley 
Committee reports of the Great War.I6  In the 1920s, while unionism was 
languishing  in  private  industry, the notion that employees of the state 
should be represented by unions was widely accepted.” The Second World 
War saw similar pressures to those in the First World War and, immedi- 
ately after the war, the nationalization of major industries resulted in the 
establishment of public corporations which were legally required to rec- 
ognize trade unions and to set up collective-bargaining machinery. The 
consequence was that the employees of all public corporations were rep- 
resented by  unions and had their terms of employment settled through 
collective bargaining. By  1980, union density among full-time employees 
of nationalized industries was 97 percent and that in public administration 
(principally, local and central government) was 89 percent.18  At that time, 
about 31 percent of workers were employed in public administration or 
employed by public corporations, so a significant fraction of all employees 
worked for an employer-the  state-that  expressly promoted collective 
bargaining for its workers. 
Furthermore, government encouraged private employers to recognize 
unions. It did so not by setting up procedures by which workers may deter- 
mine whether they wanted union representation. On the contrary, as noted 
above, British law had been largely silent on the issue of union recognition. 
However, the law did specify consequences if an employer refused to rec- 
ognize a union. This became explicit during the Second World War when 
the National Arbitration Tribunal could impose on a nonunion firm wages 
and working conditions that the tribunal felt appropriate. When presented 
16. The outbreak and furtherance of the Great War gave a boost to the role of trade union 
leaders in the administration of industry and government. This helped to portray unions as 
responsible organizations representing the legitimate interests of working people. Simulta- 
neously, tight labor markets gave labor organizations at the factory floor the sort of muscle 
that was largely denied them before the war. To contain the shop stewards’ movement, David 
Lloyd George’s Coalition government appointed in  1916 a committee under the chairman- 
ship of J. H. Whitley, a Liberal member of Parliament, to suggest ways “for securing a per- 
manent improvement in the relations between employers and employed.” The reports of the 
Whitley committees encouraged the recognition by employers of unions and proposed, in sec- 
tors where unions were well-established, a hierarchical structure of employer-union industrial 
councils designed to discuss and negotiate wages, work hours, and other aspects of employ- 
ment contracts. The reports embraced public employment as well as private employment and, 
though the government was initially resistant to accord unions rights of negotiation and rep- 
resentation, soon government employees found themselves so represented. 
17. The House of Commons debated in 1923 a resolution stating “that local authorities, 
banks, insurance and shipping companies, and other employers of professional and clerical 
workers should follow the example of the Government in recognizing the organizations of 
these workers.” Receiving broad support, the resolution passed without division on a free 
vote. 
18. See table 11.1 of Daniel and Millward (1983). 192  John Pencavel 
with the possibility of having terms of employment imposed on them by 
the state, many nonunion employers felt it preferable to recognize a union 
and engage in collective bargaining to ensure it had some role in determin- 
ing its wages. Such compulsory measures were made less draconian in peace- 
time. Nevertheless, by a series of Fair Wages resolutions, those private-sector 
employers with government  contracts were obliged to pay their workers 
wages set by collective bargaining in neighboring or comparable firms.’9 
Another mechanism bolstering collective bargaining in Britain was pro- 
vided  by  minimum-wage  regulation.  Unlike  in  France and the United 
States, where minimum-wage laws embrace almost all blue-collar workers, 
Britain’s minimum-wage regulation had been selective. For instance, with 
legislation in  1917, agriculture was identified  as an industry warranting 
wage floors and other low-wage sectors (such as retail trade and catering) 
were added subsequently  by  the establishment of  sector-specific wages 
councils.20  By  1980, among employers  outside of collective bargaining, 
about one-third of managers claimed that the pay of their manual workers 
was set by wages councils.21  Such wage-setting machinery was regarded as 
inferior to collective bargaining and the expressed hope was that, in due 
course,  the wages  councils  would  be  supplanted by  union-negotiated 
agreements. In practice, wages councils set wages with reference to those 
negotiated by unions in neighboring industries. The consequence was to 
extend union wage regulation to sectors beyond those where unions were 
explicitly organized. 
There were other ways in which government lent indirect  support to 
19. Otto Kahn-Freund regarded the 1946 Fair Wages Resolution as “one of the corner- 
stones of British labour law” while Wedderburn described it as “at least a prop for the British 
structure of collective bargaining” (Wedderburn 1986, 347-349). (The 1946 Fair Wages Res- 
olution was preceded by  analogous resolutions in 1891 and 1909.) The extension of collec- 
tively bargained wages to workers not covered by the collective agreements  was effected by ar- 
bitration by the Ministry of Labour between 1940 to 1959. The same principle was enshrined 
in the terms and conditions of the Employment Act of 1959 (see United Kingdom: Royal 
Commission 1968a, 60-61). The Employment Protection Act of 1975 set up the Central Ar- 
bitration Cornmittce,  which had the power to oblige employers of nonunion labor to observe 
those terms of employment obtaining in similar unionized activities or in the same district. 
This was rescinded in the 1980 Employment Act. In September 1983, the Fair Wages Resolu- 
tion was annulled. 
20. It is intriguing to note that, whereas in Britain agriculture was singled out early for 
statutory wage regulation, in the United States it was singled out for exclusion from the Fair 
Labor Standards Act in 1938.  The exclusion of farm workers from various pieces ofNew  Deal 
legislation was engineered in the US. Congress by Southern legislators who faithfully repre- 
sented the interests of Southern landowners. See Alton and Ferrie (1999). 
21. See Daniel and Millward (1983, 179-180). The authors maintain that these responses 
exaggerate the extent of wage regulation by the councils because “First, . . . some managers 
erroneously took negotiating bodies like Whitley Councils or joint industrial councils to he 
wages councils. . . .  Secondly,. . . some establishments  that did not recognize unions adopted 
the rates specified by some wages council . . . as the basis for their rates of pay, even though 
formally they were not bound by those rates.” In either event, through error or voluntary con- 
sent, a substantial number of nonunion employers set wages in relation to those specified by 
regulatory bodies. The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain  193 
unionism. One took the form of discouraging competition in product mar- 
kets. A monopolistic or oligopolistic firm normally provides a much more 
hospitable environment for unions to survive and flourish than a competi- 
tive firm, so government may influence the extent and strength of unionism 
by its posture toward product market competition. 
Though its origins can be traced to the nineteenth century,22  the view 
that competitive markets would produce the least objectionable outcomes 
for society became an  increasingly unfashionable doctrine in Britain as the 
twentieth century evolved. Again, the Great War was a catalyst in this de- 
velopment because the successful conduct of the war was seen to require a 
sudden and extensive intrusion of the state in all kinds of activities. When 
peace was restored, some looked to restore a modest role for the state. 
However, many others had become accustomed to an interventionist state 
and they viewed the state as the primary vehicle for effecting change within 
British industry, which was diagnosed as too small and balkanized to com- 
pete effectively in international markets with  larger and more efficient 
American and German companies. In the 1920s, the “rationalisation” of 
British industry was the label given to mergers and takeovers that the state 
expressly encouraged to create benefits of large economies of scale.23 
In the interwar period, the monopolization and oligopolization of in- 
dustry occurred with ownership remaining in private hands. In the years 
after the Second World War, the same process took the form of creating 
public monopolies covering large swathes of industry-electricity,  gas, 
coal, railways, urban transport, airlines,  telecommunications, and (for 
many years) steel. The dominant philosophy behind the “rationalisation” 
movement in the 1920s and the nationalization movement after the Sec- 
ond World War was one of skepticism of the virtues of competition and 
approval of large and monopolistic enterprises. 
Labor unions firmly supported the nationalization  of industry. Some 
unionists believed public ownership of industry would eliminate the adver- 
sarial nature of bargaining, but this tenet was soon belied by highly con- 
tested disputes whether government was in the hands of the Labour Party 
or the Conservative Party. Public ownership tended to politicize collective 
bargaining, with government ministers entangled in disputes that were re- 
solved often with little relation to the financial performance of the indus- 
tries.  Being monopolies,  these nationalized  industries’ strikes  imposed 
heavy costs on consumers. 
Hence, in summary, collective bargaining in Britain by the end of the 
1970s was frequently described as a “voluntary” system because the law 
was largely silent on important issues such as union recognition, the re- 
22. The classic statement of these trends is, of course, found in Dicey (1914). 
23. On rationalization in the 1920s, see Robinson (1931, 169) who defines it as the “semi- 
compulsory reorganisation” of industry. 194  John Pencavel 
quirement  to bargain,  the enforcement  of  collective-bargaining  agree- 
ments, the right to strike, and the structure of unionism. The dominant at- 
titude up to the end of the 1970s was that these factors were best addressed 
by the parties concerned, with little need for state reg~lation.’~  However, 
this characterization is misleading in that, through a number of indirect 
channels, government in Britain exercised a large influence on unionism 
and collective bargaining. By its activities as an employer, by setting mini- 
mum wages in selected industries, by requiring government contractors of- 
ten to pay union-negotiated wages, and by discouraging product market 
competition, the state played an  important indirect role. In these activities, 
the state encouraged collective bargaining and helped to create the condi- 
tions in nonunion labor markets and in product markets that fostered 
unionism.25  On top of this, as noted above, the macroeconomic policies fol- 
lowed by successive postwar British governments and especially the im- 
portance attached to the goal of full employment provided the backdrop 
for unions to assume a conspicuous role in the formation and execution of 
economic policy. 
In providing this indirect support for collective bargaining and union- 
ism, the Labour and Conservative governments from the Second World 
War to the 1970s were responding to the dominant views in the country. 
Until 1979, when asked “Generally speaking, do you think trade unions 
are a good  thing or a bad  thing?” the percentage responding  “a good 
thing” always exceeded the percentage responding “a bad thing” (see fig. 
5.3). Only once, in fact (shortly after the miners’ strike in  1974), was the 
percentage responding “a  good thing” less than 50 percent.26  The state’s in- 
direct support of collective bargaining, therefore, appeared to be more or 
less what the electorate wanted. This was not an instance where a small, yet 
influential, pressure group hijacks government policy to further its own 
ends without the general public’s acquiescence. On the contrary, whatever 
doubts economists may have had about the beneficial effects of unionism, 
a majority of the electorate had a benign and favorable view of ~nionism.~’ 
24. As noted above, Edward Heath’s Conservative government  at the beginning of the 1970s 
took a very different posture, but it was not acting with a mandate to make industrial relations 
more legalistic. Indeed, when asked in February 1974, “Who runs the country?” the electorate 
did not give Heath’s government the ringing endorsement it was seeking. 
25. Roy Adams (1993,295) makes a similar argument: “Despite the absence of extensive 
legislation, the policy of British governments in the 20th century has not been neutral, as the 
policy of voluntarism is sometimes  interpreted to imply. In fact, British policy has been to en- 
courage collective bargaining. It has done so by  notifying all public servants that collective 
bargaining is the preferred means of establishing conditions of work, by requiring govern- 
ment suppliers to recognize the freedom of their workers to join unions and engage in collec- 
tive bargaining, and by directly intervening  in many disputes in order to pressure intransigent 
employers to recognize unions and to negotiate with them.” 
26. A discussion of these Gallup Opinion Poll responses from 1954 to 1985 is provided by 
Edwards and Bain (1988) and Marsh (1990). 
27. Along with the dominant view of the electorate, some employers felt workers were en- 
titled to the protections and representations of labor unions and, instead of fighting them, 
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Fig. 5.3  Responses to survey question about trade unions, 1970-1997 
Sources: The Gallup Political and Economic Index, thc Gallup Organization, and the Daily 
Telegraph. 
Nutes: Percentage responding “a good thing,” “a bad thing,” and “don’t know” (or who re- 
fused to respond) to the question, “Generally speaking, do  you think trade unions are a good 
thing or a bad thing?” There were two surveys in 1974 and the entry in the graph for this year 
is a simple average of the two responses. 
In the almost forty years from the outbreak of the Second World War to 
some point in the 1970s, there was broad consensus regarding the appro- 
priate posture toward unionism:  there should be a minimum  of direct 
statutory promotion of unionism but considerable indirect support. This 
view was explicitly challenged by Edward Heath’s Conservative Govern- 
ment in the early 1970s and issues concerning unionism figured promi- 
nently in the 1974 general election campaign. However, the government’s 
attempt to convert the system into something closer to the American le- 
galistic structure was not endorsed by the electorate. At the same time, the 
Labour Party’s small margin of victory in February 1974 was a signal that 
the broad consensus on unionism was breaking down. 
no means universal: some employers (especially those operating in highly competitive prod- 
uct markets) stoutly resisted union representation of their workers and actively opposed at- 
tempts to organize workers. Nevertheless, in other instances, employers saw unions as the 
rightful agents of their employees’ concerns. 196  John Pencavel 
5.3  The New Policy toward Unionism 
5.3.1 
After a winter of extensive strikes in 1978-1979, the general public tired 
of the corporatist  style of the Labour government in which labor union 
leaders sometimes seemed to occupy a separate arm of government. For 
the first  time in its history,  the Gallup Organization’s question asking, 
“Generally speaking, do  you think trade unions are a good thing or a bad 
thing?”  revealed  in  1979 that an equal percentage of the British public 
replied “bad thing” as “good thing” (see fig. 5.3). Remarkably, the corre- 
sponding Gallup Opinion Poll in the United States also recorded a record 
low approval percentage in the same year.28 
In 1979, an unhappy electorate voted in the most doctrinaire British gov- 
ernment since Clement Atlee’s administration elected in 1945. In contrast 
to Atlee’s government, Thatcher’s government was committed to shrinking 
the public sector and emasculating corporatist institutions such as labor 
unions. Sure enough, the subsequent Conservative governments reduced 
the state’s indirect support of unionism and collective bargaining by  de- 
nationalizing a number of industries, by eliminating minimum-wage floors 
in specific industries, and by suspending the rules extending union wage 
scales to non-union employers. 
The ideas for reform came in part from the growing influence of laissez 
faire critics who viewed the state of Britain’s labor markets as illustrative of 
the pervasive and suffocating role of government on the economy. Britain’s 
sluggish economic growth and the habitual tendency for inflation to get out 
of control induced the search for more drastic policies. The dominance of 
the two-party system in Britain meant that, by the late 197Os, the electorate 
looked  to the opposition party,  the Conservative  Party, for new  ideas. 
Within the Conservative Party, the middle-of-the-road  policies associated 
with R. A. Butler and Harold Macmillan in the 1950s and 1960s had given 
way to more radical ideas. The key individual funneling laissez faire ideas 
from the right wing into the Conservative Party in the late 1970s was Keith 
Joseph who, in turn, had the ear of the party’s leader, Margaret Thatcher.2y 
The Change in Economic Policy 
28. The U.S. question is, “Do you approve or disapprove of labor unions?’  From 1936 to 
1972, the percentage responding “approve” was 60 or above. Then, in the 1970s,  a decline be- 
gan that reached a minimum of 55 percent in May 1979 and August 1981. Since then, the ap- 
proval percentage has climbed to 65 percent in August 1999. See Cornfield (1999). 
29. The arguments of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman were widely disseminated. 
Hayek, in British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts in  1978, argued, “These legalised 
powers [from the 1906  Trade Disputes Act] of the unions have become the biggest obstacle to 
raising the living standards of the working class as a whole. They are the chief cause of thc un- 
necessarily big differences between the best- and worst-paid workers. They are the prime 
source of unemployment. They are the main reason for the decline of the British economy in 
general.” (Reproduced in Hayek 1980,52.) The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain  197 
Trade unions were one of the principal issues of the day, so what was the 
new government’s posture on unions and collective bargaining? Two key 
elements can be identified, one concerning macroeconomic management 
of the economy and the other relating to productivity. On macroeconomic 
policy, incomes policies and the bargains with unions to secure their coop- 
eration in wage restraint were to be a thing of the past. The postwar Key- 
nesianism  that accorded full employment a primacy  of place in policy 
goals and that provided such a hospitable environment for unionism was 
dropped. The pursuit of price stability became the paramount goal and 
control over the money supply was supposed to be the principal means. 
On productivity and economic growth, by  supporting a culture of re- 
strictive work practices (especially in public-sector employment) and ad- 
versarial  labor  relations, unions  (together with  unimaginative  manage- 
ment and excessive government regulation) were blamed for Britain’s poor 
performance. The aspects of industrial relations marked for special atten- 
tion were strikes, the closed shop, and union governance. Frequent strikes 
were viewed not only as inconveniencing the community, but also as dam- 
aging productivity. The closed shop was seen as making “it possible for 
small groups to close down whole industries with which they have no direct 
connection.”30  On union governance, there was a belief that the union lead- 
ership tended to be more radical than the rank and file, so the Conserva- 
tive government proposed making unions more accountable to their mem- 
bers. In general, the goal of greater labor productivity required a shake-up 
of industrial relations and the trimming of trade union entitlements. 
Looking at subsequent events, some components of this program were 
certainly met: The macroeconomic environment became much less amen- 
able to unionism although price stability proved to be elusive. Labor union 
entitlements were clipped, industrial relations practices changed substan- 
tially, closed shops became rare, union governance reformed, and strike ac- 
tivity fell sharply. Has this caused a higher growth in productivity? This is 
less clear. Let us consider these issues in turn. First, consider the changes 
in  the macroeconomic environment and how legislation on strikes, the 
closed shop, union governance, and indirect support for unionism changed 
after 1979. The issue of unionism and productivity merits special attention 
in the section that follows. 
5.3.2  The Macroeconomic Setting and Structural Changes 
in the Economy 
The overriding goal of macroeconomic policy was to eradicate infla- 
tionary tendencies from the economy, a goal shared by macroeconomic 
managers in some other countries. The chosen mechanism was a gradual 
30. From Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool 
on 12 October 1979. See Harris (1997). 198  John Pencavel 
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Fig. 5.4  U.K. unemployment rate, absolute and relative to unemployment rates in 
the United States and France, 1970-1999 
Sources: The unemployment rates in this graph are “standardized”  unemployment rates from 
the OECD, drawn from issues of OECD’s Economic Outlook. 
reduction in the rate of growth of the money supply coupled with a reduc- 
tion in the public-sector borrowing requirement as a fraction of gross do- 
mestic pr~duct.~’  The consequences for unemployment were tremendous, 
as shown in figure 5.4. Compared with its level over the forty years since the 
outbreak of the Second World War, unemployment has remained high in 
the years after 1979 and it has only been in the late 1990s that unemploy- 
ment rates have reached levels comparable with those of the 1970s. 
31. To operate on expectations, a trajectory for monetary growth was declared. The mini- 
mum lending rate rose to an unprecedented 17 percent in late 1979 and 1980. In the second 
half of 1979, the rate of change of average earnings increased from 10.1 percent to 18.8 per- 
cent and, as this was accompanied by an appreciation in the sterling exchange rate, the im- 
pact on British competitiveness in foreign markets was severe. “The degree of overvaluation 
of sterling in the second half of 1980  was unprecedented in the post-war period and well in ex- 
cess of the overvaluation rcsulting from the return to the gold standard in 1925” (Dimsdale 
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Britain was by no means the only economy to experience a large rise in 
unemployment in the 1980s, but the increase in Britain was larger than in 
most. Figure 5.4 also shows the unemployment rate in the United King- 
dom relative to unemployment rates in the United States and France. From 
the early 1980s’ Britain’s unemployment rate has been consistently above 
that in the United States. The U.K. unemployment rate was also higher than 
France’s throughout the 1970s until 1987, but since that time unemploy- 
ment in the United Kingdom has fallen gradually to almost half that in 
France. 
It is customary to argue that an  increase in unemployment signals a drop 
in alternative employment opportunities and, consequently, a fall in labor’s 
bargaining power. If correct, the years of the 1980s until the mid-1990s are 
characterized by a chronic attenuation of labor union bargaining power. 
Indeed, this loss may well have been enhanced by the fact that some of the 
areas of union strength such as manufacturing and mining were especially 
hard hit both by the recession and by the trimming of the budgets of na- 
tionalized industries and the transfer of some of their assets to the private 
sector. This leads naturally to the question of whether the contraction of 
unionism since 1979 in Britain is simply a reflection of changes in the struc- 
ture of British industry and, in particular, the consequence of the decline 
of employment in industries of union strength, such as manufacturing and 
mining, and the growth of service employment, some of whose areas have 
been difficult to organize. Indeed, employment in manufacturing in 1998 
was less than 60 percent of its level in 1979 and coal-mining employment 
constituted a trivial fraction of total employment. 
In fact, little of the decline in union membership density from 1979 to 
1999 arises from simple industrial changes. If the industrial employment 
structure of 1979 is applied to the union density by industry in 1999, the 
difference between actual union density in 1999  and that implied by this ex- 
periment is only a few percentage points.32  This is because many sectors of 
traditional union strength had already contracted substantially by  1979 
(thus coal-mining employment represented only  1 percent  of total em- 
ployment), while employment in other areas of traditional union strength, 
such as health services, has expanded considerably. Changes in industrial 
structure are not a principal explanation for the decline in unionism over 
the twenty years since 1979.33 
32. Similarly, if the broad industry structure in 1998 is applied to the union density by in- 
dustry in 1979, the larger part of the decline in unionism is left unaccounted for. The data for 
these analyses are derived from Price and Bain (1983), the July 1980  issue of the Employnzent 
Gazette (for employment figures in 1979), the June 2000 issue of Labour Market Trends (for 
employment  figures in 1998),  and the July 2000 issue of Labour Market Trends (for union den- 
sity in 1999). This analysis is undertaken at the broad industry level (eleven industries identi- 
fied) because more-disaggregated data appear not to be available. 
33. This conclusion was reached also by Disney (1990) and Freeman and Pelletier (1990) 
for the years of the first half of the 1980s. 200  John Pencavel 
Other changes in the structure of unionism are suggested by the data in 
table 5.2. According to all of the categories of union density listed in this 
table, the record is one of union decline-by  gender, by broad occupation, 
by industry, by region, and by private-public ownership.34  These are figures 
on union membership, but the message is the same if data on the coverage 
of collective bargaining agreements are examined: in  1973, the wages of 
about 73 percent  of  employees  were  covered  by  collective-bargaining 
agreements; this fell to 70 percent in 1984, to 54 percent in 1990, and to 40 
percent in 1998. In the private sector, the 1998 figure is 21  In 
other words, there has been a steady erosion in the extent of unionism and 
in union-negotiated agreements in the economy. Though there were some 
highly publicized cases of derecognition of unions, the principal factor in 
this membership decline has been the failure of unions to gain recognition 
in newly formed workplaces: The greatest declines in the extent of union- 
ism are found in plants in private manufacturing that have been established 
since 1980;  by contrast, in the public sector, there is no decline in union rec- 
ognition in newly established workplaces (see Disney, Gosling, and Machin 
1996; Machin 1999; and Millward, Bryson, and Forth 2000,84-85). 
Given the critical role of management in determining whether to grant 
union recognition, the failure of unions to gain a foothold in newly formed 
establishments is, in part, a commentary on employers’ attitudes toward 
collective bargaining. From 1979 until 1997, successive government minis- 
ters and “experts” attacked the notion that unionism enhances the perfor- 
mance of the economy and, indeed, they replaced this with the idea that 
union leaders tend to behave capriciously and without due reference to  the 
wishes and interests of their members. Certainly, some union leaders ap- 
peared to fit this profile  This campaign against collective bargaining 
and the endorsement of the virtues of narrow self-interest have generated 
an environment in which managements are less inclined to see unions as 
the legitimate representatives  of the interests of the workers. Compared 
with the decades of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the new breed of employ- 
ers is less altruistic in their dealings with their own employees and this has 
manifested itself in the view that unions are irrelevant or, worse, damaging 
to the enterprise. A long and sustained campaign would be required to 
change these attitudes among those who will be managers in the next few 
decades. Legislation stipulating that, provided that a workplace vote of 
34. As indicated in the footnote to table 5.2, precise comparisons of union density across 
these years are impossible because of differences in definitions of union mcmbership and in 
employment. This tablc is useful, therefore, for broad trends only. 
35. These figures are from Milner (1995) and Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000, 197). Ac- 
cording to Hicks (2000), in 1999, 17 percent of employees who were not mcmbers of unions 
claimed their pay and work conditions were covered by a union-negotiated agreement. This 
implies that, approximately, three million workers are “free riding” on union activities. 
36. A conspicuous example was provided by the coal miners’ leader, Arthur Scargill. He re- 
fused to  hold a ballot beforecalling amomentous  strike in 1984-1985 and he managed to have 
himself elected president of the union for life. The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain  201 
Table 5.2  Union Membership Density, by Various Characteristics, 1979 and 1999 



































































Sources: The data for 1979 are taken from Price and Bain (1983), except for the regional data, 
which are from Millward and Stevens (1988). The regional data are for 1984. (The Southeast 
excludes greater London.) The data for 1999 are from Hicks (2000). These three sources de- 
fine union density differently and the delineation of the regions is not the same for the two 
years. 
employees so determines, a union may be foisted onto a reluctant manage- 
ment may be the prelude to more adversarial industrial relations and, ulti- 
mately, unsuccessful unionism. 
5.3.3  Strikes 
The Thatcher administration’s posture toward strikes belied its laissez 
faire proclivities. This was because statutory law regulating strikes became 
more, not less, extensive under her governments. Really radical legislation 
would have been the repeal of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, which pro- 
tected a union from being sued by an employer for damages resulting from 
a r trike.^' What happened under the post-1979 Conservative governments 
37. After all, proponents of laissez faire sided with Dicey in describing the 1906 act as con- 
ferring “upon every trade union a privilege and protection not possessed by  any other per- 
son or body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, throughout the United King- 
dom. . .  . It makes a trade union a privileged body exempted from the ordinary law of the 202  John Pencavel 
was that unions’ legal immunity from damages became more qualified: A 
union became liable for damages if striking against a secondary employer; 
an employer could sue a union if the strike was not over industrial relations 
issues that the employer could address, but over, say, political issues or in- 
terunion feuds that the employer had no control over; and a union would 
lose its immunity if the strike had proceeded without the union’s first se- 
cretly balloting its members and obtaining the support of a majority for 
strike action. In 1993, unions were obliged to give seven days’ warning of a 
forthcoming strike. Regulations on picketing became more stringent, with 
the police granted more power to confine the influence of pickets. In those 
circumstances where the union lost its immunity, its financial liabilities for 
damage were proscribed by law. In instances where the union undertook 
strike action without first balloting its members and ignored court injunc- 
tions to desist, the union’s funds can be ~equestered.~~ 
Employers were granted more discretion over the dismissal of strikers.39 
Early in the 198Os, employers had the authority to reengage strikers selec- 
tively after a certain time had passed while, in 1990, employers could dis- 
miss striking workers selectively if the union had not authorized the strike. 
Given  the tendency for  strikes  to be unofficial, these  seemingly small 
modifications in the law sapped the shop stewards’ bargaining power.4o 
The number and importance of strikes in Britain have fallen consider- 
ably (see fig. 5.2). Whereas in 1980 some 22 percent of establishments re- 
ported some sort of “industrial action” during the previous twelve months, 
in 1998 the corresponding figure was 2 per~ent.~’  To what extent can this 
decline in disputes be attributed to the legal changes in the  1980s and 
199Os? Strike activity has fallen in most countries, though more in Britain 
than elsewhere. The last column of table 5.3 shows annual working days 
land. No such privileged body has ever before been deliberately created by an English Parlia- 
ment” (Dicey 1914, xivi). Thatcher’s government could have simply repealed the 1906  act and 
allowed employers to take striking unions to court. 
38. In some respects, the British law came closer to that in the United States where second- 
ary boycotts and certain other types of strikes are illegal. Also, a case law has built up in the 
United States over what types of picketing are legal. However, the balloting of workers to se- 
cure approval for a strike is not the law in the United States even though many unions prac- 
tice it. Whereas in Britain the concern was that union leaders tend to be more militant than 
the rank-and-file workers, in the United States the contract rejection problem seemed to sug- 
gest that the union rank and file tended to be more militant that the leadership. 
39. Unfair dismissal law was introduced in 1971. Before that date, employers had the au- 
thority to dismiss any striking worker, although such discharges  were uncommon. The 1974- 
1979 Labour government ruled that employers could dismiss striking workers and not be li- 
able for damages for violating the law on unfair dismissals, provided all those striking were 
dismissed. Dismissing some workers and retaining others or rehiring some workers and not 
hiring others rendered the employer liable for damages. 
40. Of course, the national union could declare the strike official, but if the necessary bal- 
loting had not taken place this cxposed the union to damage claims. 
41. See Millward and Stevens (1986, table 10.1) and Cully et al. (1999, fig. 6.4). It is reveal- 
ing that, in 1986, Millward and Stevens devote an entire chapter of over thirty pages to “in- 
dustrial action” while, in 1999, Cully et al. allocate a little over a page to the topic. The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain  203 
Table 5.3  Working Days Lost through Stoppages per Thousand Employees  in All 
Industries and Services, Annual Averages, 1981-1998 










































































































Sources: Employment Gazette (December 1991,653), Labour Market Trends (April 1997, 130; 
April 2000, 148). 
Notes: Stoppages cover both strikes and lock-outs. Definitions and coverage of stoppages 
vary across countries so these data should not be relied upon to  justify strong inferences about 
intercountry differences. 
lost through strikes per thousand employees in the years 1994-1998  as a 
fraction of those in 1976-1980.  This ratio is consistently less than unity, but 
its lowest value is for Britain: in the period from 1994 to 1998,  annual work- 
ing days lost per employee in Britain constituted merely 4 percent of their 
level in 1976-1980! 
There are many competing explanations for this change, so it is difficult 
to determine the particular contribution of the law. Even if the power of 
unions were throttled, it always takes two parties to strike, so an explana- 
tion may focus as much on the enhanced opportunity of management to 
wage a profitable strike as on the reduced power of unions to conduct a suc- 
cessful strike. Current modelling of disputes would suggest that they are 
the consequence of information asymmetrically shared between the union 
and management. Did the Conservative governments’ legislation alter the 
allotment of information and, in this way, did it result in fewer disputes? 
It is plausible that the mandatory balloting of workers before strikes pro- 
vides information to both management and the union about the workers’ 
resolve if a strike does occur-provided  those voting reveal their propen- 
sities accurately. In an analysis of the impact of balloting procedures, Undy 
et al. (1996) argue that these procedures had a small effect on the course of 204  John Pencavel 
strike activity. However, they did find that “balloting provided a compara- 
tively low-cost and credible way  of demonstrating the resolve of union 
members without calling on them to engage in strike action” (230) and, in 
this  sense, the  legislation  contributed  to  alleviating  the informational 
asymmetry between management and unions and helped to reduce strikes. 
Undy et al. also conclude that “the threat, and demonstration of the dam- 
aging financial effects, of legal actions by employers made many union ne- 
gotiators more cautious and risk-averse in their dealings with employers 
during disputes” (230). On balance, this balloting legislation helped reduce 
strike activity although it is unlikely to have been a principal factor. 
Of course, the vast majority of strikes occur at unionized establishments, 
so, insofar as the legislation clipped the reach of unionism, the govern- 
ment’s agenda can be said to have caused a decline in strike activity. 
5.3.4  Closed Shops 
The Conservative governments directed several pieces of legislation to 
the closed shop. In 1974, the Labour government established that an em- 
ployer could not legally use union membership as a criterion for firing a 
worker. However, it was permissible to fire an employee if he or she refused 
to join a closed shop. In 1988, dismissal because of either union member- 
ship or nonmembership was determined unfair and, in this respect, an 
equivalence between members and nonmembers was resolved. Because 
nonmembers could not be fired, this dealt a blow to the postentry closed 
shop. In 1990, the law turned from dismissal to hiring: employers could not 
refuse to hire workers based on their union membership status. This un- 
dercut the preentry closed shop.42 
This legislation has contributed to the virtual elimination of the closed 
shop. In 1980, some workers were covered by a closed shop in 23 percent of 
workplaces. This number was as high as 88 percent in the nationalized in- 
dustries. In 1998, according to the responses of managers, merely 2 percent 
of workplaces were identified where employees had to be union members 
to retain their  In some respects, the closed shop has gone under- 
ground  in  that sometimes  employers  (especially  in  the  public  sector) 
“strongly recommend membership.” Nevertheless, the attack on the closed 
shop has been largely won. 
There are two questions. The first is whether this victory over the closed 
42. In the United States, the “closed shop” corresponds to the British “pre-entry closed 
shop,” while the “union shop” is what in Britain goes by the name of the “postentry closed 
shop.” The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made the closed shop illegal in the United States in in- 
terstate commerce, while states with “right-to-work” laws prohibit the union shop. 
43. The 1980 figures are taken from Millward and Stevens (1986, table 4.3) and describe 
workplaces with at least twenty-five employees. The 1998 figure is from Cully et al. (1999,89) 
and describes workplaces with at least ten employees. Whereas in Millward and Stevens the 
closed shop merits a seventeen-page chapter, in Cully et al. the closed shop receives a couple 
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shop may be attributed to the legislation alone. This is doubtful. The pre- 
entry closed shop was most extensive in old craft-related activities that 
have been heavily affected by technological change-newspapers,  print- 
ing, shipping, and docks-and  it is probable that many closed shops would 
have been swept aside anyway by the onslaught of the new technology. 
The second question is whether this victory over the closed shop  is an  im- 
portant one. There is no doubt that the closed shop was correlated with a 
number of outcomes: For instance, in 1980 and 1984, the union-nonunion 
wage differential tended to be greater when the unionized establishment 
had a pre-entry closed shop.44  However, the unresolved question is whether 
this was the consequence of the closed shop or the consequence of some- 
thing else that also produced the closed shop. Indeed, this problem frus- 
trates the interpretation of many correlations between variables in indus- 
trial relations where cause and effect are especially hard to disentangle. 
According to this alternative hypothesis, the closed shop is as much an out- 
come variable as wages or work hours, so the closed shop should be seen as 
an indicator of union influence or as a signal of managerial  preference^,^^ 
not their cause. 
5.3.5  Union Governance 
Laws were introduced strengthening the rights of rank-and-file union 
members in dealing with their own organizations. It was stipulated that di- 
rect, secret elections of union officials must occur within every five years 
while, every ten years, ballots must be held to approve any political expen- 
ditures the union makes. Union members were given rights to examine 
their unions’ accounting records. A worker was required to provide prior 
written consent to an employer who automatically deducts union dues 
from the worker’s paycheck. This consent needed to be renewed every three 
years. This prompted the unions to wage a campaign to encourage work- 
ers to approve automatic check-off and to encourage employers to support 
the practice. By  1998, some two-thirds of unionized establishments prac- 
ticed the check-off (Cully et al. 1999,89). In that year, the Labour govern- 
ment repealed the requirement for written approval of the check-off. 
The drop in union member~hip,~~  the penalties incurred by some unions 
44.  See Stewart (1987, 1995) and Metcalfand Stewart (1992). 
45. It was sometimes argued that management used the closed shop to discourage the for- 
mation of morc unions and to help enforce discipline in environments with a propensity to- 
ward anarchy. 
46. It needs emphasizing that not only has union membership as a fraction of employment 
dropped, but the absolute level of union membership has fallen considerably. According to 
data published in the Employmenr  Gazette and reported to the certification officer, union 
membership at the end of 1979 was 13,289 thousand whereas at the end of 1998 it was 7,807 
thousand, more than a 40 percent drop. There is a large literature devoted to accounting for 
movements over time in union membership and density. For example, by constructing their 
own indicator of the legal climate of collective bargaining and by drawing inferences from the 
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for illegal actions, and the effect of various measures (such as balloting be- 
fore taking strike action) to make the union leadership more accountable 
to its rank and file left the finances of the unions in a more precarious state 
by  the late-1990s than for many decades. Though many unions operate 
more efficiently than they have ever done and increasingly have the ap- 
pearance of friendly societies (just as they did in the nineteenth century, 
when they provided a whole array of cash payments to cover untoward 
events such as accidents, illness, and retirement), their resources to support 
their members in lengthy strikes have been severely attenuated. 
5.3.6  Indirect Effects on Collective Bargaining and Unionism 
In describing the state of labor markets before the accession to power of 
a series of Conservative governments, I argued that, through a number of 
indirect measures, the state provided widespread support of unionism and 
collective bargaining. These indirect measures included the role of the state 
as an employer, the practice of setting minimum wages in certain indus- 
tries, the requirement that government contractors pay union-negotiated 
wages, and the impediments to product market competition. The Conser- 
vative governments explicitly addressed all these indirect measures. 
Public-sector finances were placed under stringent constraints and pay 
negotiations were governed less by notions of “comparability” with private- 
sector wages and more by  whether pay levels were generating adequate 
supplies of labor. Where possible, collective bargaining was decentralized. 
Indeed, one of the most important changes in bargaining since 1979 has 
been the notable decrease in multi-employer  agreement^.^' Such decentral- 
ized agreements tend to be more sensitive to the particular circumstances 
of the employer and the plant. 
By denationalizing (or “privatizing”) large parts of the public sector, the 
state became a less far-reaching employer. In 1978, public-sector employ- 
ees represented 3 1 percent of all employees. Twenty years later, the number 
had fallen to 20 percent.48  The policy was designed also to encourage com- 
petition in product markets. However, privatizing industries is not the same 
as ensuring a competitive environment and, in many cases, the issue be- 
came one of choosing between a private monopoly and a public monopoly. 
Strikes against private monopolies have the same opportunity for impos- 
ing costs on consumers as strikes against public monopolies. Moreover, a 
ascribe most of the decline in density in Britain in the 1980s to the less supportive legal envi- 
ronment for collective bargaining. See Metcalf (1991) for a briefcritical review of the research 
on union density in Britain. 
47. In 1984, of all workplaces where collectivc bargaining was the dominant form of pay 
setting, 69 percent of them were multi-employer agreements. By  1998, this had fallen to 46 
percent. Among all workplaces in  1998, just  13 percent had wages determined by  multi- 
employer agreements and 6 percent in private-sector manufacturing. See Millward, Bryson, 
and Forth (2000, 186-188). 
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number of these industries are still in the state’s hands, so the unions in 
these sectors retain considerable leverage. Yet, the public sector itself was 
obliged to be more sensitive to its costs: in the 1970s most local and central 
government services were delivered by unionized, state employees; in the 
1980s and 1990s, by “contracting-out” these services to (often nonunion) 
private firms, competitive pressures were injected into union-supplied ac- 
tivities. 
The practice of setting minimum wages in certain industries was at- 
tacked by eliminating wages councils while the requirement that govern- 
ment contractors pay union-negotiated wages was eliminated by repealing 
the Fair Wages Resolution in 1983. More generally, statutory rules guided 
wage determination much less and firm- or plant-specific factors have di- 
rected earnings changes. Performance-related pay mechanisms have gained 
in  popularity and earnings structures simplified. The consequence has 
been for real wages to rise throughout the earnings distribution, but high- 
paid workers have seen their wages increase much faster than the low-paid 
(see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 
1996  and Schmitt 1995). More generally, notwithstanding the introduction 
of a new National Minimum Wage in 1999, the relatively narrow wage dif- 
ferentials characteristic of corporatist economies are not an appropriate 
description of British labor markets in 2000. 
5.4  Unionism and Productivity 
5.4.1  The Contribution to Changes in Productivity 
The relationship between productivity (measured in different ways) and 
unionism has been the subject of a good deal of research. The basic reason 
this has been difficult to unravel is that, even if production functions were 
identical in unionized and nonunionized workplaces, productivity differ- 
ences would emerge between the two classes of firms insofar as collective 
bargaining affects wages. If wages are higher in the unionized firm, if the 
firm may freely adjust inputs in response to these price differences, and if 
the firm does not throw resources away, employment will tend to fall and 
labor productivity will be higher in the union jirm. Ideally, the researcher 
would like to present the unionized and nonunion firms with various com- 
binations of the same inputs and then observe their outputs. In fact, the re- 
searcher does not select the inputs; the firms select the inputs and this se- 
lection is made in response to input prices. 
In addition to the wage effects of collective bargaining, unionism has 
nonwage effects on a firm’s operations, which implies that, even when man- 
agement is free to make decisions about the use of labor, the unionized 
firm’s labor productivity will differ from that of the nonunion firm. For in- 
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their interests, workers will tend to be more cooperative and forthcoming 
in unionized workplaces, and that unionism involves participation  and 
participation begets higher productivity. Conversely, unionism may pro- 
tect slothful working habits and defend malfeasance, which lower labor 
productivity. As most scholars have recognized, a priori arguments cannot 
settle whether, on balance, this effect works to raise or lower productivity 
in union workplaces. 
The previous two arguments assume labor input choices are made uni- 
laterally by management. There is a third effect of unionism on productiv- 
ity insofar as unions do not grant management a free hand in labor input 
decisions. Through bargaining either explicitly over the level of labor input 
or implicitly through resisting organizational changes that raise produc- 
tivity, labor input in unionized establishments may exceed the levels other- 
wise implied by the wages and technical efficiency of the labor force.49  In 
fact, when the subject of unionism and productivity was posed in Britain 
in the 1970s and 198Os, it was this third class of arguments that tended to 
find most frequent expression. 
Other routes by which unionism may affect productivity have been con- 
jectured. For instance, the fear that a union may capture the rents from in- 
vestment in physical plant and equipment may discourage management 
from undertaking such investments (Grout 1984). This implies lower capi- 
tal stock in unionized plants. The impact on productivity is less clear. With 
lower capital, output will be lower and, if output per worker is a positive 
function of the level of physical capital, then labor productivity will be 
lower. But whether output per factor input (total factor productivity) will 
be lower is less obvious. Indeed, in the simplest of cases, in this situation, 
total factor productivity is likely to be greater in the unionized plant. This 
illustrates that the impacts of unionism on productivity and on productiv- 
ity growth are far from obvious and that they are likely to depend on pro- 
saic issues of variable definition and measurement (such as whether labor 
productivity or  total factor productivity is being rnea~ured).~~ 
Productivity in unionized establishments will compare unfavorably with 
that in nonunion establishments insofar as unions are effective in discour- 
aging the introduction of new production technologies into workplaces. 
However, the examination of the responses to questions in the 1984 Work- 
place  Industrial Relations surveys (WIRS) about technological change 
49. This form of productivity effect of unionism accords well with the stories about the in- 
efficient use of workers in British industry entertainingly illustrated by Fred Kite’s union in 
“I’m All Right Jack.” If the bargaining power of the union over employment is reduced, then 
employment will fall and output per worker will rise. This is a once-and-for-all increase in la- 
bor productivity, not a permanent increase in the rate of growth of productivity. 
50. Another awkward measurement issue arises out of the fact that a number of studies use 
some measure of the value of output in the definition of productivity: If unionism has effects 
on input prices, these will normally be transmitted to output prices, ensuring, by construc- 
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does not support the popular view of British unions as twentieth-century 
L~ddites.~~  Thus, Daniel (1987) finds that trade union resistance to techni- 
cal change is very much the exception. Shop stewards tend to be more sup- 
portive of the introduction of advanced technology than the workers, who, 
in turn, are generally favorably disposed. There were exceptions to this find- 
ing. Most noticeably, the nationalized industries constituted an important 
pocket of resistance to technical change. However, in general, unions much 
more frequently supported, not opposed, such change. 
The weight of the evidence seems to suggest the following assessment: 
Up to the early 1980s, unionism was associated with lower labor produc- 
tivity, but, in the 1980s, this gap was narrowed because the highly union- 
ized sector tended to exhibit faster productivity  The causes of 
this faster growth are difficult to identify, but most frequently mentioned 
are the combined consequences of a more competitive product market en- 
vironment and the Conservative government’s labor relations legislati~n.~~ 
This raises the distinction between the effects of unionism on the level of 
productivity and the effects of unionism on the rate of growth of produc- 
tivity. Some authors have gone so far as to suggest that a lower level of 
union density will result in a permanently higher growth in productivity. 
This is exactly the position taken by  Bean and Crafts, who argue that 
“the changed industrial relations scene of the recent past has not only al- 
lowed  a  once-and-for-all  productivity  gain,  but  also  improved future 
growth potential” (1996,161). What aspects of this “changed industrial re- 
lations scene” have contributed to these permanent productivity gains? 
The legislation against closed shops is unlikely to have been profound be- 
cause closed shops are more a symptom than a source of union strength. 
Similarly, legislation making unions more accountable to their own mem- 
bers is unlikely to have enhanced workplace productivity. 
Bean and Crafts (1 996) suspect that the decline in multi-unionism (i.e., 
the presence of more than one union at a workplace) was the foremost la- 
bor market feature raising Britain’s productivity growth. The key piece of 
evidence they offer for this is a regression fitted to a pooled data set of 
about 137 three-digit industries (predominantly manufacturing) and eight 
5  I. Of course, the popular view of the Luddites is also wanting. See Hobsbawm (1964). 
52. This assessment conforms to Metcalf’s (1989, 1990) very informed statement of our 
knowledge by the end of the 1980s. Also see Booth’s (1995) review. 
53. An example of a study supporting this conclusion is that of Gregg, Machin, and Met- 
calf (1993), who show that, in a sample of 328 private companies in the late 1980s, real sales 
growth was greater in those firms employing workers where some union derecognition had oc- 
curred. Also included in the specification is a variable measuring increased foreign compe- 
tition, although the presence of unionism  in this equation implies that the coefficient on 
increased  competition  measures the effect of competition  on  real  sales growth  holding 
unionism constant. In fact, increased foreign competition may have been the spur to derec- 
ognize the union, in which case the full effects of competition involve consideration of the 
unionism variables, too. In this study, unionism and the change in union status are treated as 
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subperiods from 1954-1958  to 1982-1986.  The dependent variable is the 
annual growth in total factor productivity. However, there is no time series 
information on their key variable, the fraction of workplaces in which there 
is more than one manual union, so the 1980 cross-section variation in this 
variable is assumed to take on the same values over three decades. This is 
quite heroic: there were more than 700 unions in 1954, the beginning year 
of their estimating period, and about 400 in the early 1980s, the end of their 
period of study. The assumption that the incidence of multi-unionism is a 
constant also prevents them  from allowing for permanent unobserved 
differences among these ind~stries.~~  This specification constitutes a weak 
reed for any reliable inferences about the impact of multiple unionism on 
the growth in productivity. 
Nevertheless, the issue of multi-unionism recurs in evaluations of indus- 
trial relations practices. For instance, using the 1984 WIRS, Machin, Stew- 
art, and Van Reenan (1993) exploit information on  responses by managers 
who assess their  establishments’ financial performance compared with 
that of other establishments in the same industry. They find that, where 
management bargains  separately with  each of the unions-a  so-called 
“fragmented bargaining structure”-the  firm’s financial performance suf- 
fers. They suggest that where the union forms a single bargaining commit- 
tee and management bargains with this committee “around a single table,” 
unfavorable outcomes are not apparent. In other words, where manage- 
ment insists on the unions’ joining together for purposes of bargaining 
with them, there are no untoward effects of multi-unionism on pay, finan- 
cial performance, and strikes.ss 
The history  of unionism in Britain abounds with instances in which 
groups of workers seek to preserve their identities in separate organizations 
and find it more effective to pursue their aspirations in their distinct asso- 
ciations. This evidence suggests that such multi-unionism does not damage 
the financial performance of firms, provided the unions band together for 
the purposes of collective bargaining with management. In creating an en- 
vironment in which managements had greater authority to insist upon the 
elimination of fragmented bargaining structures, public policy in the 1980s 
54. A part of their argument involves the use of what they call a “multiple union dummy” 
that prior to 1979 takes the value of zero and from 1979 equals the value of the fraction of 
workplaces with more than one union. This allows for the effect of multiple unionism to differ 
in the 1979-1982 and 1982-1986  subperiods from that in earlier periods. The coefficient esti- 
mated on this variable is positive, from which they infer that the damaging effects of multiple 
unions was less in the early 1980s. Because the extent of multiple unionism barely changed in 
the early 1980s (see Millward and Stevens 1986, 73),  something happened in the early 1980s 
to ameliorate the impact of multiple unionism. This “something” would seem to be the vari- 
able we seek rather than multiple unionism itself. 
55. In related work, Machin and Stewart (1990, 1996) report that in 1980,1984, and 1990, 
financial performance is lower in unionized establishments although much of this takes the 
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and 1990s made British industrial relations less of a drag on economic 
growth-or  so some observers would have it. 
5.4.2  Labor Productivity, Financial Performance, and Unionism in 1998 
What is the most recent evidence of the effects of multi-unionism and 
fragmented bargaining? And, after all this remarkable retreat in unionism, 
what is left of the association between productivity and unionism? To ad- 
dress this, I turned to the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
(WERS) and examined the responses concerning financial performance 
and labor productivity. In this survey, a representative from management 
was told, “I now want to ask you how your workplace is currently per- 
forming compared with other establishments in the same industry. How 
would you assess your workplace’s financial performanceAabor productiv- 
ity?” The following five categories of responses were used in the subsequent 
analysis: “a  lot below average”; “below average”; “about average for the in- 
dustry”; “better than average”; and “a lot better than average.”56 
There are some obvious shortcomings in assessing an organization’s 
financial performance and productivity on the basis of management’s per- 
ceptions. How well-informed is the manager of the competitors’ perfor- 
mance, and how much wishful thinking goes into his or her responses? 
However, there are also severe shortcomings in conventional measures of 
performance and productivity. When firms produce different goods and 
employ different types of labor, the configuration of output per labor input 
across firms must use some price indices to put diverse outputs on a com- 
mon footing, and the quantity of worker-hours ought to be adjusted in 
some way for skill differences in labor. Most workers are now employed in 
the service sector where the measurement of output is fraught with special 
problems. 
Similar concerns arise in conventional measures of financial  perfor- 
mance. Even when available (and frequently it is not), accounting profits 
does not map precisely into the organization’s rate of return and, when a 
workplace is part of a larger organization, its “profits” are not only not 
defined, they are also secondary to the organization’s “bottom line.” This 
does not mean that the answers of a manager to these questions provide 
ideal indicators of a workplace’s productivity and performance. The argu- 
ment is simply that they contain information that may well be useful in 
drawing inferences about a workplace’s effectivene~s.~~  Indeed, manage- 
56. There are two other categories-“no  comparison possible” and “relevant data not 
avdilabk”-but  few observations are in these categories and they will not be used. Most of 
these workplaces are in public administration, health, and education. 
57. “[A] quarter of workplaces did not operate in the trading sector, and for these notions 
of profit and loss simply do  not apply. Similarly,  the concept of labour productivity has mean- 
ing in all workplaccs, but there are no standardised measures in many sectors. For example, 
there are no conventional measures of value-added which would allow a comparison of the 
labour productivity of a hospital against a school” (Cully et al. 1999, 120). 212  John Pencavel 
Table 5.4  Cross-Classification of Workplaces by Labor Productivity and Financial 
Performance, 1998 
Labor Productivity 
A Lot  Better  ALot 
Financial  Below  Below  Than  Better Than 
Performance  Average  Average  Average  Average  Average  Total 
A lot below average  4  2  0  3  0  9 
Below average  2  25  46  14  5  92 
Average  1  28  343  143  12  527 
Better than average  2  13  209  337  41  602 
A lot better than average  0  2  39  98  115  254 
Total  9  70  637  595  173  1,484 
ment’s assessments may well embody qualitative considerations that con- 
ventional measures of productivity and financial performance have diffi- 
culty in recognizing. In fact, Machin and Stewart (1996) report that the less 
favorable the managers’ assessments of their financial performance in the 
1984 WIRS, the greater the probability of the workplace having closed 
down by 1990. 
For the investigation in this paper, workplaces were discarded if they had 
missing values on any variables used in the analysis below, and this left 
1,484  workplace observations from the 1998 WERS to investigate. The dis- 
tribution of responses on labor productivity cross-classified by responses 
on financial performance is provided in table 5.4. Evidently, most man- 
agers like to think that their workplaces are either average or better than 
average. There is a clear positive correlation between the responses on la- 
bor productivity and those on financial performance: the null hypothesis 
of no association between the two responses is rejected on a chi-square test 
at a very high level of significan~e.~~ 
Workplaces are divided into four categories based on their union and 
bargaining status: nonunion workplaces; workplaces with a single union; 
workplaces with many unions but with joint bargaining; and workplaces 
with many unions engaging in separate bargaining. In the 1998 WERS, of 
the 1,484 workplaces, 597 are nonunion, 322 are single-union workplaces, 
337 are workplaces with many unions engaging in joint bargaining, and 
228 are workplaces with many unions engaging in separate bargaining. The 
distribution  of responses on labor productivity by  type of workplace is 
given in figure 5.5 and those on financial performance in figure 5.6. The 
proportion of managers in nonunion workplaces who assess their work- 
place to be “a  lot better than average” is greater in the nonunion sector, but 
this is offset, at least in part, by their lower frequency of assessing their 




Nonunion  One Union  Joint Bargaining  Separate Bargaining 
Types of Workplaces 
a lot below average  below average 
0  average  better than average 
g] 
Fig. 5.5  Labor productivity by unionism and bargaining structure, 1998 
a lot better than average 
workplace as simply “better than average.” If the percentage of responses 
of “a lot better than average” and “better than average” are aggregated, the 
distribution of responses across the four types of workplaces is as follows: 
Single  Many Unions and  Many Unions and 
Nonunion  Union  Joint Bargaining  Separate Bargaining 
Labor productivity  50.7  55.9  53.4 
Financial performance  59.0  60.9  56.9 
46.1 
50.8 
The workplaces  with the least favorable aggregate responses  are those 
where many unions operate and bargain  separately  with management. 
This general theme will recur. 
To determine whether union-nonunion differences in labor productivity 
and financial performance are contained in these data and whether differ- 
ences exist by bargaining structure, suppose T,  is a latent measure of labor 
productivity or of financial performance in workplace i. Initially, posit that 





Nonunion  One Union  Joint Bargaining  Separate Bargaining 
Types of  Workplaces 
a lot below average  Effl  below average 
a lot better than  average 
3 average  better than  average 
Fig. 5.6  Financial performance by unionism and bargaining structure, 1998 
other variables 4,  and of unmeasured factors, e,,  that include the charac- 
teristics of the respondent: 
(1)  T,  = ay  + py  + e,, 
where e, is assumed to be distributed normally with zero mean and unit 
variance. This standardized normal assumption will permit the estimation 
of an ordered probit model. Although T,  is unobserved, the categorical re- 
sponses to the questions do provide information on this latent variable. 
These categorical responses are denoted byp, where we adopt the conven- 
tion that p, = 1 for workplaces designated to be a lot below average, p, = 2 
for those reported as below average, p, = 3 for those described as average, 
p, = 4 for workplaces better than average, andp, = 5 for those characterized 
as a lot better than average. The relation between the observed variablep, 
and the unobserved variable T,  is given as follows: 
p, = 1  if  T,  9 m, 
p,=j  if  m,-,<T,sm,,  j=2,3,4 
p, = 5  if  m4  5 T,, 
where the censoring parameters, them’s, are to be estimated jointly with a 
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Table 5.5  Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of the Effects of Unionism and 
Bargaining Structure on Labor Productivity  and Financial Performance 
(estimated asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) 
1998 Survey  1990 Survey 
Labor  Financial  Labor  Financial 
Productivity  Performance  Productivity  Performance 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Equation (1) 
I. v,  -0.031  -0.134  -0.382  -0.220 
(0.063)  (0.062)  (0.157)  (0.160) 
2. g  -0.007  -0.052  -0.247  -0.142 
(0.077)  (0.076)  (0.168)  (0.172) 
3. g . M,  0.058  -0.054  0.145  -0.085 
(0.089)  (0.088)  (0.266)  (0.267) 
4. (!.$  -0.191  -0.283  -0.386  -0.187 
(0.097)  (0.096)  (0.143)  (0.143) 
Equation (2) 
Equation (3) 
5. M,  0.054  -0.041  0. I56  -0.071 
(0.091)  (0.090)  (0.268)  (0.269) 
(0.099)  (0.098)  (0.146)  (0.145) 
6. S,  -0.198  -0.271  -0.388  -0.198 
of the coefficient on  given in columns (1) and (2) of line one in table 5.5.59 
By  conventional statistical criteria, the null hypothesis of no association 
between these indicators of labor productivity and the incidence of union- 
ism cannot be rejected. However, this is not the case for the measures of 
financial performance where the presence of unionism is associated with 
lower financial returns. 
The implications of these estimates are provided in table 5.6, where col- 
umn (1) lists union-nonunion differences in labor productivity and column 
(2) lists union-nonunion differences in financial performance as implied by 
the estimates in line one of table 5.5.60  Union-nonunion differences in labor 
productivity are trivial. Those in financial performance suggest that union 
workplaces are 3 percent less likely to be a lot better than average and 2 
59. For the estimates of the (Y parameters in table 5.5, the X,  variables consist of the fraction 
of employees who are part-time, the fraction of employees who are  women, six dichotomous 
variables of workplace size, and six dichotomous variables indicating how long the workplace 
has been at the present location. Workplace size and years of operation seem necessary con- 
trol variables in a study of productivity. A number of other specifications were applied with 
small changes in general inferences. The U,  variable takes the value of unity if any ofthe  work- 
place’s employees belong to a union. For all the equations whose results are reported, likeli- 
hood-ratio tests suggest a statistically significant relationship between, in turn, the produc- 
tivity and performance indicators and the set of right-hand-side variables. 
60. The union-nonunion differences and the separate-joint bargaining differences are eval- 
uated at the mean values of all the other variables. Table 5.6  Implications of Estimates for Differences in Labor Productivity  and Financial Performance, by Union and Bargaining Status 
Equation (1):  Equation (2):  Equation (3): 
Difference between Separate and  Difference between Union and  Difference between Separate and 
Nonunion Workplaces  Joint Bargaining  Joint Bargaining 
Labor  Financial  Labor  Financial  Labor  Financial 
Productivity  Performance  Productivity  Performance  Productivity  Performance 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Prob(a lot below average) 
Prob(be1ow average) 
Prob(average) 
Prob(better than average) 
Prob(a lot better than average) 
Prob(a lot below average) 
Prob(be1ow average) 
Prob(average) 
Prob(better than average) 
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percent less likely to be better than average compared with nonunion work- 
places. The superior performance of nonunion workplaces in financial 
performance is compatible with a rent-reallocation view of unions accord- 
ing to which unions appropriate some of an organization’s rents, 
To determine whether the bargaining structure plays a role in this, con- 
sider specifying the union’s impact in equation (1) in the following manner: 
a  = a. + a1  M, +  a2St.  Here, M,  is a dichotomous variable taking the value 
of  unity in those workplaces where more than one union operates, but 
where these unions collaborate as far as collective bargaining is concerned. 
Such workplaces are characterized by joint bargaining. S, is a dichotomous 
variable taking the value of unity for those workplaces with many unions 
and with separate (or “fragmented”) bargaining. Substituting this expres- 
sion for a  in equation (1) yields the following estimating equation: 
(2)  IT,  = a&  + a,qML  + a2qS,  + pXt + e,, 
where a. denotes any effect on IT, of a single union workplace, a. + aI  of a 
multiple-union workplace where the unions bargain jointly, and a@  + a2  of 
a multiple-union workplace where the unions bargain separately. The or- 
dered probit estimates of the a  coefficients of this equation are contained 
in lines two, three, and four of columns (1) and (2) of table 5.5. By conven- 
tional criteria, the estimates of the coefficients of a. and a,  would not be 
judged as significantly different from zero. However, the estimate of  a2 
would be judged as significantly less than zero both for the labor produc- 
tivity equation and for the financial performance equation. The implica- 
tions of these estimates of a2  are contained in columns (3)  and (4) of table 
5.6, which reports the difference between two multiple-union workplaces, 
one where unions bargain separately and one where the unions bargain 
jointly. For labor productivity, workplaces with fragmented  bargaining 
have a 4  percent lower probability of being a lot better than average and a 
4 percent lower probability of being better than average compared with a 
workplace where the unions bargain jointly. Similarly, in terms of financial 
performance, when bargaining is fragmented, the workplace is 6 percent 
less likely to be a lot better than average and is 5 percent less likely to be 
better than average compared  with a workplace with joint bargaining. 
These results are consistent with the view that, if a union-nonunion differ- 
ence obtains, it is the bargaining structure that accounts for this difference, 
with fragmented workplaces reporting relatively lower productivity and 
lower financial performance than multiple-union workplaces where bar- 
gaining is joint. 
Finally, consider fitting equation (2) to the 887 unionized workplaces 
only (so for all observations q = 1): 
(3)  IT, = a,M,  + a2S,  + pX)  + el. 
The ordered probit estimates of the a  coefficients of equation (3)  are given 
in columns (1) and (2) of lines five and six in table 5.5 and again the sug- 218  John Pencavel 
gestion is that what matters for labor productivity and financial outcomes 
is not multi-unionism per  se, but  whether  bargaining is joint or frag- 
mented. The implications of these estimates are contained in columns (5) 
and (6) of  table 5.6 where, among multi-union workplaces, those where 
fragmented bargaining take place are 3 percent less likely to have labor 
productivity a lot better than average and 5 percent less likely to have labor 
productivity better than average compared with those workplaces with 
joint bargaining. Similarly, on financial performance, workplaces with a 
fragmented-bargaining score 5 percent lower on the probability of being a 
lot better than average and 5 percent lower on the probability of being bet- 
ter than average compared with workplaces with joint bargaining. 
These results are compatible with the following interpretation. On av- 
erage, by the late 1990s, unionism per se has negligible effects on produc- 
tivity; the state of labor relations is the key variable associated with pro- 
ductivity;  and, in  Britain, workplaces  with  fragmented  bargaining  are 
associated  with  poorer  productivity.  With  respect  to financial perfor- 
mance, unions tend to reallocate an organization’s rents toward workers 
and, in Britain, this occurs more substantially in fragmented-bargaining 
workplaces. 
Having arrived at these findings from the 1998  WERS, I went back to the 
1990 WIRS to determine whether similar patterns are evident in this es- 
tablishment survey, too. Trying to fit the very same equations to the 1990 
data as already estimated to the 1998 data, the results are given in columns 
(3) and (4) of table 5.5 with inferences regarding the probability distribu- 
tions in the bottom part of table 5.6.h’ The results are broadly similar to 
those for 1998, although there are a few interesting differences. According 
to column (3) of line one in table 5.5, in 1990 unionized workplaces have 
significantly  lower  labor  productivity  than  nonunionized  workplaces. 
Thus, as reported in column (1) in the lower part of table 5.6, unionized 
workplaces have a 6 percent lower probability of being classified as “better 
than average” and a 9 percent lower probability of being classified as “a lot 
better than average” compared with nonunionized workplaces. It appears 
again as if it is workplaces with fragmented bargaining where this differen- 
tial is concentrated. This is suggested by the estimates in lines two, three, 
61. Regrettably, by trying to fit the very same equation and dropping observations on work- 
places if a missing value is encountered on any one variable, we arrive at a much smaller num- 
ber of establishments: 380 workplaces. Of these, 66 consist of nonunion workplaces, 139 are 
single-union workplaces, 20 are workplaces with many unions but with joint bargaining, and 
155  are  workplaces with many unions and fragmented bargaining. (Note that,  in the 1990 sur- 
vey, eleven of the single-union workplaces were said to have more than one bargaining unit. 
For our analysis, we assumed that such multi-unit bargaining by a single union may be inter- 
preted as joint bargaining, although, in principle, this is something that could be tested.) As 
in the 1998 survey, the responses on labor productivity and those on financial performance 
are strongly positively correlated on a conventional chi-square test. The  cross-classification of 
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Table 5.7  Cross-Classification of Workplaces by Labor Productivity  and Financial 
Performance, 1990 
A Lot  Better  ALot 
Financial  Below  Below  Than  Better Than 
Performance  Average  Average  Average  Average  Average  Total 
A lot below average  0  2  5  1  3  11 
Below average  0  9  8  6  0  23 
Average  1  11  72  38  11  I33 
Better than average  0  10  27  29  26  92 
Total  1  37  150  142  50  380 
A lot better than average  0  5  38  68  10  121 
and four of table 5.5 and the probability differences in column (3) in the 
lower part of table 5.6. 
With respect to financial performance, there is again the suggestion that 
workplaces with fragmented bargaining tend to report lower financial per- 
formance compared with workplaces with joint bargaining. However, this 
is less evident than it was in the 1998 data. The point estimates in column 
(4) of table 5.5 are not much greater than their estimated standard errors. 
The implications of these point estimates for the probability distributions 
(table 5.6) suggest that meaningful differences occur only for the probabil- 
ity of being “a lot better than average” where workplaces with fragmented 
bargaining have a 6 or 7 percent lower probability compared with work- 
places with joint bargaining. All this is compatible with the view that such 
fragmented workplaces are the establishments where remnants of the in- 
dustrial relations climate of the 1970s live on. 
5.4.3 
A maintained hypothesis throughout this section is that the association 
between vi,  on the one hand, and unionism and the bargaining structure, 
on the other hand, reflects the impact of unionism and bargaining struc- 
ture on T,.  In other words, I follow the assumption (mostly tacit) in this lit- 
erature that the relationships computed embody the effects of unionism on 
productivity and on financial performance. There is ample reason to ques- 
tion this maintained hypothesis: The incidence of unionism (and different 
bargaining structures) may well depend on an establishment’s productivity 
or financial standing, so the associations computed reflect the effects of 
productivity (or financial performance) on patterns of unionism and the 
bargaining structure. As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, iden- 
tifying causal relationships in these labor issues is hard. 
Subject to this important qualification, this empirical research suggests 
that, by the end of the 199Os, average union-nonunion differences in labor 
productivity appear to be negligible. Where differences emerge, they are in 
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those establishments with fragmented bargaining. Such bargaining is un- 
usual-approximately  only 7 percent of workplaces in 1998 were charac- 
terized  by  fragmented bargaining6*  This allows the generalization that 
unionism may serve as an agent permitting employees to participate in 
shaping their work environments with little or no loss in productivity. 
5.5  The Benefits of Unionism to Workers 
The ultimate mission of unionism is to enhance the lot of employees in 
various ways. Some of these ways are through increasing the employees’ 
monetary compensation. In addition, unions aim to increase the partici- 
pation of workers in fashioning their work environments. One might ex- 
pect that the decline in unionism in Britain over the past two decades 
would have been accompanied by a fall in employees’ monetary and non- 
monetary rewards from work. Is there evidence that this has happened? 
5.5.1  Unions and Wage Differences 
First consider the benefits from unionism as suggested by the gap be- 
tween the wages paid to unionized and to nonunionized workers. Here 
there appears to be more disagreement than there is in the United States 
over each economy’s patterns of union-relative wage effects. For manual 
workers in Britain, the central tendency of the estimates of the gap between 
union and nonunion wages was approximately 10 percent in the 1980s. 
This estimate varied by  plant and worker characteristics so that, for in- 
stance, it was near to zero for a very large number of establishments, but 
was as much as 14 percent for semiskilled manual workers in a pre-entry 
closed shop condition (see Stewart 1987,1991). The union-nonunion wage 
differential is higher when product markets are not competitive and is close 
to zero when product markets are competitive (Stewart 1990). However, 
there are studies where both smaller and larger wage differentials have been 
estimated (see, e.g., Andrews, Bell, and Upward 1998 and Hildreth 1999). 
Some of these variations may be attributed to differences in the workers be- 
ing studied and to control variables used. There is need for a systematic ex- 
planation for the variations among these estimates.h3 
There is also not a consistent pattern regarding estimates of the change 
in the union-nonunion wage gap over time. Some researchers (e.g., Blanch- 
flower  1999) infer that the union-nonunion wage gap has remained re- 
62. This figure of 7 percent is arrived as follows. According to WEKS, collective bargaining 
was the dominant form of pay setting in 1998 in 29 percent of workplaccs (Millward, Bryson, 
and Forth 2000, 186). Among these workplaces, the proportion not using single-table bar- 
gaining fell from 60 percent in 1990  to 23 percent in 1998 (Millward, Bryson, and Forth, 203). 
Hence, among all workplaces, the incidence of fragmented bargaining is about 7 percent (23 
percent of 29 percent). 
63. An important step toward that systematic explanation is supplied by Andrews, Stewart 
et al. (1998), who apply different estimating procedures and specifications to a single data set. The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain  221 
markably  constant since the early  1980s; others suggest small declines 
(eg,  Stewart 1991, Hildreth 1999); while still others hint at rising union- 
nonunion wage gaps (e.g., Andrews, Bell, and Upward 1998). In view of 
these mixed results, it is difficult to be confident about the movements over 
time in union-nonunion wages. However, I am inclined to accept the im- 
plications from the more straightforward computations (such as those of 
Blanchflower) that suggest small variations over time in union-nonunion 
wage gaps.M If this is true, then is this stability in the face of declining 
unionism a paradox? Not necessarily. Suppose union-nonunion wage gaps 
in  1980 varied across workplaces, and suppose workplaces where these 
gaps were least have dropped out of the union sector; then declining union- 
ism will be accompanied by  rising union-nonunion wage gaps. This ex- 
ample illustrates how the changing composition of workplaces in the union 
sector may yield average union-nonunion wage differentials that are rising, 
falling, or constant over time. But taken at face value, the typical union 
worker’s higher pay over his or her nonunion counterpart has changed little 
over the past twenty years. Or, expressed differently, for those who believe 
that unions raise the pay of nonunion workers as well as those of union 
workers, the decline in unionism since the late 1970s has not hurt the aver- 
age nonunion worker’s pay any more than the average union worker’s pay. 
5.5.2  Unions and Work Life 
Consider now some nonmonetary aspects of the work environment. 
Drawing on data from the repeated British Social Attitudes surveys, figure 
5.7 graphs the percentage of employees who give unfavorable responses to 
questions regarding labor relations and the quality of management. For in- 
stance, the series “poor employee relations” measures the percentage of 
employees who believe they work at establishments where labor relations 
are unsatisfactory. The series “not well managed” measures the percentage 
of employees who have unfavorable views of the quality of management at 
their places of work. These two series may have drifted up slightly over the 
decade since 1983, but whatever changes there have been look very small 
by comparison with the decline of  unionism.65  Not surprisingly, the per- 
centage of employees who believe they have no voice in workplace deci- 
sions (given by the series “no say in work decisions”) has risen, although 
again the change is very much smaller than the drop in union representa- 
64. This preference derives from what seems to be the case with the U.S. research, where in- 
genious, sometimes baroque, estimating methods yield much more fickle and unreliable esti- 
mates than more prosaic methods; see Lewis (1986). This does not mean necessarily that the 
same will be the case in Britain, but it does affect the way I place my bets. 
65. The unfavorable percentage response in 1996 for “poor employee relations” is signifi- 
cantly greater than that for 1983  on a standard normal test while the response in 1996 for “not 
well managed” is not significantly different from the response in 1983. Regardless, the argu- 
ment in the text is that the changes between 1983 and 1996 are very much smaller than the re- 
treat of unionism. 222  John Pencavel 
45  50 I 
35 
10 >!-A  30 
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Year 
+--  union density as recorded by the Certification Officer 
+  poor employee relations 
not well managed 
no say in work decisions  --t- 
Fig. 5.7  Employees’ perceptions and union membership density, 1983-1996 
Notes: The series measuring employees’ perceptions are drawn from Bryson and McKay 
(1997). Union density data are the same as those graphed in figure 5.1. 
The series “poor  employee relations” measures the percentage of employees who respond 
“not very” or “not at all” to the question, “In general, how would you describe relations be- 
tween management and other employees at your workplace: very good, quite good. not very 
good, or not at all good?” The values for 1988 and 1992 are interpolated. 
The series “not well managed” measures the percentage of employees who respond “not 
well managed” to the question, “In general, would you say your workplace was very well 
managed, quite well managed, or not well managed?” The values for 1988 and 1992  are inter- 
polated. 
The series “no say in work decisions” measures the percentage of employees who respond 
“no say” when asked, “Suppose there was going to be some decision made at your place of 
work that changed the way you do your job. Do you think that you personally would have any 
say in the decision about the change or not?” The values for 1986,1988,1990,1992,1994,  and 
1995 are interpolated. 
tion and most of the change took place in the 1980s,  not the 1990s as union- 
ism continued its retreat. Given the sharp drop in union density over this 
same period from the 1980s to mid-l990s, the absence of a strong move- 
ment in these perceptions is noteworthy. 
The 1998 WERS reported that about half of employees felt managers 
treated them fairly and that 65 percent agreed or strongly agreed that they 
felt loyalty toward the organizations they worked for (see Cully et al. 1999, The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain  223 
table 8.3 and fig. 8.6).  A suppressed resentment of management is not evi- 
dent from these figures. Workers are much more likely to have unfavorable 
attitudes regarding labor relations at their places of work if those work- 
places were unionized. Employees at establishments with no worker repre- 
sentation were most likely to see their industrial relations as “very good.”66 
Moreover, the belief that unions make a meaningful difference to work 
life is not widely maintained: 46 percent of union members and only 30 
percent of nonunion members believe that unions make a difference to 
what it is like at  Even among union members in recognized work- 
places, about the same fraction felt the union was no better than the indi- 
vidual at representing an employee’s interests about work complaints (see 
tables 9.6 and 9.7 of Cully et al. 1999). In the 1999 British Social Attitudes 
survey, among employees in unionized workplaces, fewer than two in five 
(37 percent) felt the union helped in running the establishment (Bryson 
1999). Though there are some exceptions, the fall in unionism within con- 
tinuing workplaces in the private sector is not attributable to manage- 
ment’s hostility to unions, but to “a withering of support for membership 
among the existing workforce, plus a lack of recruitment as the workforce 
evolved” (Millward, Bryson, and Forth 2000,92). Management attributed 
the decline in the recognition of unions at the workplace to a drop in em- 
ployees’ interest in union representation and to a rethinking of policies to- 
ward employee relations by management (Millward, Bryson, and Forth, 
105). The impression from these figures is that unions are not being suc- 
cessful in persuading employees that they need union representation, so 
there is little in these numbers to support Towers’ (1997) claim that there is 
a serious representation gap in British workplaces. 
One reason workers appear not to have grieved over the loss of union 
representation is that various “direct” forms of participation-workplace 
meetings, briefing groups, and problem-solving groups-have  grown in 
place of “indirect” forms, such as unions and consultative committees. 
Asking employees for their assessment of the effectiveness of these direct 
mechanisms, Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000, 128-135) find that these 
nonunion voice mechanisms seem to work well in informing employees of 
proposed workplace changes and in making management responsive to 
66. It has sometimes been argued that unions are inclined to make workers more aware of 
shortcomings in their work environments and that this explains why union members tend to 
report less-favorable labor relations. However, in the 1999 British Social Attitudes survey, 
nonmembers working in unionized workplaces had significantly less favorable perceptions on 
labor relations than nonmembers in workplaces without unions. See Bryson (1999). 
67. In fact, employees were divided into three groups: union members; never union mem- 
bers; and those who were once union members, but are no longer union members. When 
asked whether “unions make a difference to what it is like at work,” 46 percent of current 
union members agreed, 30 percent of never union members agreed, and 26 percent of former 
union members agreed.  In a separate survey, “participation throughunion  representation was 
associated with a generally more negative view of the effectiveness of work arrangements” 
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suggestions from employees. On only one dimension-whether  workers 
feel they are being treated fairly by management--is  it the case that union- 
ized workers (when represented on a consultative committee) are more 
satisfied with their workplace environments than nonunion workers with 
these “direct” forms of representation. Though unions may derive solace 
from this result, what is striking is that this is the only issue on  which union- 
ism scores significantly better than these other mechanisms. Moreover, it is 
not unionism per se that produces this result, but the combination of union 
recognition and union presence on a consultative committee, a combina- 
tion found in merely 4 percent of workplaces in 1998. 
These findings should be of real concern to union leaders. To express the 
issue starkly, they raise the question of whether unions are becoming irrel- 
evant. Instead of interacting with the agents of the union, managements 
(especially in the private sector) are making use of other means to com- 
municate with their employees, many of whom have ambivalent feelings 
about unions. Neither workers nor employers are expressing strong prefer- 
ences for the need for unionism at the workplace. While the Gallup Opin- 
ion Poll reports general sympathy (and  growing approval in the 1990s-see 
fig. 5.3) among all adults for the activities of unions, this does not appear 
to translate into a great unmet need among workers for union organiza- 
tion. Unions have lost 5.5 million members since 1979 and yet the labor 
force appears not to be clamouring for much more representation. 
5.6  A Summing-up 
The British experience over the past forty years or so offers an opportu- 
nity to draw some particular conclusions about unions in Britain and also 
to speculate on unionism in general. 
First, what explains the retreat of unionism in Britain? The changed le- 
gal framework for unionism provides an obvious explanation. However, 
laws never operate in a vacuum but in a particular context, and the context 
defines their impact. It is the context that accounts for the fact that the le- 
gal changes introduced by Heath’s government in the early 1970s failed to 
reform industrial relations. What are the principal features of the 1980s 
and 1990s context that explain why the changed legal environment had so 
much bite? 
One feature  is  the abandonment  in  the  1980s of  the goal  of  full- 
employment macroeconomic policies, which meant that organized labor 
operated in a much more inhospitable environment. The second key fea- 
ture is that the rigors of considerably greater product market competition 
in the 1980s and 1990s were transmitted to labor markets as firms recog- 
nized the necessity of reforming their labor practices. The new legal back- 
drop permitted  managements  to take charge of industrial relations, the 
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practices urgent, and the increased unemployment weakened the ability of 
unions to resist them. Above all, the legal framework allowed new firms 
greater flexibility in choosing labor relations procedures that fitted their 
circumstances and, in fact, these procedures often involved no union pres- 
ence. According to this argument, the new legislative framework of the 
1980s and 1990spermitted  the development of a new climate of industrial 
relations policies, but it was the renunciation of full employment goals and 
the harsher competitive environment that complemented the new legal set- 
ting and produced unionism’s decline.68 
How did the decline in unionism affect the growth and distribution of in- 
comes? The growth in real incomes ultimately matches the growth in pro- 
ductivity and there is some slight evidence that the decline in unionism con- 
tributed  to faster growth than would  have otherwise  occurred. It was 
argued above that, by the end of the 199Os, the association between union- 
ism and low labor productivity appears to have been broken except in those 
workplaces where many unions bargain separately. Such fragmented bar- 
gaining is now unusual so that, in general, unions are no longer a factor de- 
pressing labor productivity. 
With respect to the distribution of incomes, the sharp rise in wage in- 
equality coincides with the decline in unionism and it is difficult to resist 
the temptation to link the two. This presents the familiar dilemma: suppose 
the decline of unionism contributed, first, to a faster growth in productiv- 
ity and thus in income and, second, to greater inequality in incomes; is 
greater income inequality at a higher level of real income preferred to nar- 
rower inequality at a lower level of income? 
How has the decline in unionism affected the workplace experience of 
employees? Given the sharp reduction in union representation, the change 
in indicators of the quality of work life has been surprisingly small. There 
does not appear to be a pervasive, unmet demand for union representa- 
tion. On the contrary, the creation of new, direct forms of communication 
between management and employees have made many workers believe that 
union representation is unnecessary. Increasingly, unions are returning to 
68. Other assessments of the causes of the decline in unionism have come to conclusions 
consistent with this. Thus, Brown and Wadhwani (1990,68) conclude that “the driving force 
behind changes in industrial relations practices in the 1980s . . . has been increased product 
market competition, precipitated by a variety of circumstance, which has obliged employers 
to put their own houses in order.” In the same vein, Dunn and Metcalf (1996,93) determine 
that “unemployment, including two deep recessions, and stiffer product market competition 
remain of paramount importance in weakening unions and stimulating management .  . . 
where we can pinpoint the law’s impact, legislative intrusion does not automatically bring the 
expected economic changes. Notably, when management climinated closed shops in favour 
of merely recommending union membership, some economic consequences of ‘compulsory’ 
unionism  survived.” Haskel’s  (1991) empirical analysis of  labor productivity growth in 
eighty-one manufacturing industries from 1980 to 1986 suggests that the effects of greater 
product market competition were transferred to the labor market by shedding productivity- 
restraining practices. 226  John Pencavel 
their nineteenth-century role as “friendly societies” providing members 
with personal services such as group insurance policies, adult-learning op- 
portunities, and legal advice. 
Although the statutory agenda of the Conservative governments’ ap- 
proach to labor markets in the 1980s and 1990s was contentious at the time 
of its introduction, today much of it has passed into general acceptance. 
What has not been accepted? First, the removal of wage floors by abolish- 
ing wages councils at a time when the wage structure widened considerably 
has left observers disturbed by the consequences for low-paid workers of 
unregulated labor markets. The response has been the imposition of a Na- 
tional Minimum Wage in April 1999. Introduced at a time when general 
unemployment is not regarded as a principal policy problem, there appears 
remarkable agreement on the value of a National Minimum Wage. In part 
this is a by-product of the fact that it has been set at a level that risks only 
small employment  consequence^.^^ 
The second area of policy disagreement with the deregulation of the 
1980s and 1990s concerns procedures for the recognition  of unions in 
workplaces. To  address this, in  situations where an employer  rejects a 
union’s request for recognition, the current Labour government proposes 
a version of the North American system of representational elections.70 
How this will change the climate of industrial relations and the extent of 
unionism is difficult to forecast. Much depends on the precise operation of 
the system. However, even with the cooperation and goodwill of employ- 
ers, if the evidence brought forward in section 5.5 of this paper is correct, 
workers’ attitudes toward unions need to become more favorable before 
the drop in union representation is reversed. 
There is no general nostalgia for the 1970s brand of unionism in Britain. 
There is a sense that British labor markets are working more effectively 
than some on the European continent. The drop in  unemployment  in 
Britain compared with that in continental Europe is sometimes attributed 
to a delayed reaction to the deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s. Cross- 
country comparisons are fraught with difficulties, but among large econ- 
omies there does seem to be a pattern such that those countries that have 
avoided increases in unemployment have done so only at the cost of greater 
earnings inequality. And this trade-off seems to be related to changes in 
collective bargaining: Unemployment has tended to increase least where 
collective bargaining has shrunk the most. This is suggested by the data in 
table 5.8, which lists changes in male unemployment rates, changes in male 
earnings inequality, and changes in the coverage of collective-bargaining 
69. The National Minimum Wage was introduced at E3.60 for those aged twenty-one years 
and over and at E3.20 for those aged eighteen to twenty years. Metcalf (1999) estimates the 
National Minimum Wage affected 8 percent of previously employed workers. 
70. If the union can show that a majority of workers in the bargaining unit are union mem- 
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Table 5.8  Changes in Male Unemployment Rates, Male Earnings Inequality, and 
the Coverage of Collective Bargaining Contracts from the Late 1970s to 
1990s: Selected Countries 
Proportional  Percent Changes  Percent Changes 
Changes in Male  in Male Earnings  in Coverage of 
Unemployment Rates  Inequality  Union Contracts 





































Notes: Column (1): Let V(i, t)  be the male unemployment percentage of country i in year t. 
Column (1) lists [U(i,  1999) -  U(i,  1979)]/[U(i, 1979)]. The data are drawn from the September 
1983 and June 2000 issues of OECD’s Empluyment Outlook. 
Column (2): Let D(i,  t)  be the ratio in year t and in country i of the earnings of male work- 
ers at the 90th percentile to the earnings of male workers at the 10th percentile. Column (2) 
lists 10O*[D(i, 1995) -  D(i, 1979)]/[D(i, 1979)]. The data are drawn from the July 1996 issue of 
OECD’s Employment Outlook. 
Column (3): Let C(i,  I)  be the percentage of workers in country i and year t covered by col- 
lective bargaining contracts. Column (3) lists 100*[C(i, 1994) -  C(i, 1980)]/[C(i, 1980)]. The 
data are drawn from the July 1997 of OECD’s Employment Outlook. 
contracts in nine major economies.” Figure 5.8 graphs the relationship be- 
tween unemployment changes and changes in collective bargaining for 
these nine countries: Where the range of collective bargaining contracts 
has grown (in France, Sweden, and Germany), unemployment rates have 
increased the most; where the coverage of collective bargaining has con- 
tracted (Britain and the United States), unemployment rates have increased 
least.72  It appears as if, over the past twenty years or so, competitive and 
71. The unemployment rates of men are used to avoid the persistent differences among 
countries in the propensity of women to work. In fact, it would be better to use not merely un- 
employment rates to measure labor utilization rates, hut also employment propensities, hours 
of work, and early retirement rates. Earnings inequality usually changes slowly while cyclical 
movements in unemployment rates are much more evident. Therefore, the association be- 
tween unemployment changes and wage-inequality changes is much more sensitive to choice 
of the year to compute unemployment-rate changes than earnings-inequality changes. Pre- 
sumably “permanent” unemployment rates and other measures of labor utilization should be 
used, not those in column (1) of table 5.8. 
72. Some smaller economies do not conform easily to this story. Thus, New Zealand pro- 
vides an example of an economy where both unemployment and earnings inequality have in- 
creased while the extent of collective bargaining has fallen considerably. In the Netherlands, 
unemployment has not risen while earnings inequality and the coverage of collective bar- 
gaining agreements have changed little. The trade-offs suggested in table 5.8 seem more evi- 
dent in the larger than the smaller economies. 228  John Pencavel 
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technological  pressures on labor markets have tended to manifest them- 
selves in changes in labor utilization in economies where government and 
labor union wage-setting institutions  are extensive,  and in earnings in- 
equality where these wage-setting institutions are less intrusive or where 
they have been brushed aside. 
This is a sweeping simplification of  a much more complex situation. 
Though this emphasizes the similarity of the experience of British and U.S. 
labor markets, there are very important differences. For instance, it ap- 
pears as if flows of individuals into and out of unemployment in Britain are 
nothing like as large as those in the United States. Also, the increases in 
earnings inequality in Britain and the United States are around different 
trends in real wages, rising trends at the 10th earnings decile in Britain and 
falling trends at the 10th earnings decile in the United States. Moreover, 
while the case for a “representation gap” may be moot for Britain, it is far 
less so for the United States (see Freeman  and Rogers  1999). Further, 
Britain’s place in the European Union points to the likelihood of new reg- 
ulatory initiatives in the future, including a growing role for works coun- 
cils. All this cautions against simple classifications of countries that gloss 
over the richness of experiences. The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain  229 
However, it is palpable that British labor markets look far less “corpo- 
ratist,” far more like textbook competitive markets, than they did at the 
close of the 1970s. And the retreat of unionism is very much a part of this 
change. Indeed, because British labor markets today have a much more ex- 
acting competitive character, unions in the future will need to run much 
faster to stay in the same place. The relentless decline of unionism in 
Britain since 1979 testifies to its somewhat fragile character. The decline 
cannot be traced to a single event or circumstance, yet, bit by bit, through 
a slow yet inexorable process, British unionism has become marginalized 
in the private sector of the economy. Given the birth-and-death character 
of firms in a market economy, when the locus of unionism is at the work- 
place, unionism must constantly recruit new members and organize new 
firms simply to stay in the same place. To extend their reach, unions have 
to run even faster, something that has happened neither in Britain nor in 
the United States. The new environment that will change this is not at all 
evident. Yet it seems to be in the nature of unionism that its cycles of growth 
and decline are often unexpected. Perhaps a period of union growth in 
Britain (instigated by the growing influence of European Union legisla- 
tion) is just around the corner. If so, it will be another surprise. 
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